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PREFACE 
The importance of student groups in Hitler's accession 
to power and the earliness of their support for him are as-
pects of the rise of National Socialism in Germany which 
have received only superficial attention from historianso 
It has not been emphasized enough that especially in the 
days after World War I, students occupied a position of 
political influence generally respected by the German man 
in the street. Without their idealistic collaboration, the 
National Social ism of Hitler would have lacked an important 
II 
base. The teaching and furtherance of volkisch ideas by 
the educational institutions and their professors was im-
portant in building a spirit of support for Hitler even be-
fore he had any significant political organization to mobi-
1 ize. Moreover, students eventually came to recognize 
Hitler as the only one whose leadership and actions could 
lead to the realization of German identity and unity. He 
provided an alternative to the hated Weimar Republic, with 
II 
all its alien principles and neglect of the volkisch ideals. 
The purpose of this thesis will be to examine the influence 
of students in politics with respect to the rise of Hitler~ 
I would like to express my thanks to those who helped 
me during this study. First, am especially grateful to 
my major adviser, Dr. Douglas D. Hale. He encouraged me 
i i i 
toward the pursuit of a graduate degree and provided valu-
able academic support and patient counsel in the formula-
tion of my thesis and the organization of my researcho 
also appreciate the corrections and suggestions of the mem· 
bers of my committee, by Dr. Neil Hackett, Oro Alexander 
Ospovat, and Oro Paul Bischoffo My thanks go also to Oro 
Ralph Buckner, the affable "Head of the Beagle Kennel", for 
his human compassion and for making possible the completion 
of this paper in my "hobby" and "secret love" -- history. 
I owe also a debt of gratitude to the Bundesarchiv in 
Frankfurt, and to the private archives of the Bubenreuther 
.at Erlangen, West Germany, for allowing me the use of their 
mater i a 1 s. thank Barbara Stummer for her quite essential 
assistance in making sure I received the necessary materials. 
Thanks are due also to all my friends who helped me 
sort out my ideas and encouraged me in the composing pro-
cess. But most basic to my writing this paper is the 
motivation for it: the impression of my father on me 
through his personal notes about his experiences with the 
Nazi youth and Hitler's National Socialist regime. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Students have consistently played a significant role in 
the political and social development of Germany. They have 
been a prominent force in the course of German history and 
have maintained their influence to the present day. Student 
associations were very important in the past, as in the Re-
volution of 1848, and student groups currently provide the 
driving force behind educational reforms in Germany. 
Time after timeJ the history of the student movement 
and the history of Germany itself converge. In 1833, for 
example, a group of students vainly attempted to 1 iberate 
and unify their country through violent revolution. Fifteen 
years later, students provided much of the leadership and 
manpower for the Revolution of 1848. From 1848 to 1871, the 
student movement stood in general opposition to the conser-
vative unification of Germany under Bismarck. But by 1890, 
the academic youth had become for the most part dedicated 
supporters of the Empire. They march enthusiastically into 
the War of 1914, ready to fight for Emperor and Fatherland. 
The general economic and political malaise which char-
acterized the postwar years affected the student movement 
as well. As the government of the Weimar Republic showed 
2 
its inability to deal with the problems of inflation, politi-
cal instability, depression, unemployment, and respect from 
'abroad during the 1920s, many students began to turn toward 
extremist solutions. For some this solution was personified 
by Adolf Hitler. 
As early as 1924, when Hitler was still a prisoner at 
Landsberg Castle following his abortive Beerhall Putsch, 
the Deutsche Studentenschaft, a student organization, offer-
ed him an honorary membership. Two years later, a student 
wing of the Nazi Party was formed, the National Sozial istis-
che deutsche Studentenbund (National Socialist German Stu-
dent League). It is interesting to note that this group was 
politically active even before the full development of the 
NSDAP. Hitler himself observed with some surprise in 1931, 
11 1 wonder why the national student movement is developing so 
fast in comparison to the other National Socialist organiza-
tions.111 
There is no question that the National Socialist ideo-
logy was attractive to a large proportion of the academic 
youth. The distance between what the students expected of 
Germany and the reality of the Weimar Republic was too deep 
for compromise, and in working against what they considered 
to be the imperfections of the Republic, they sometimes in-
advertently became tools of the Nazi movement. Moreover, 
the economic situation of the students was insecure at best; 
financial aid promised by the government was either non-
existent or inadequate. Some students consequently embraced 
3 
the Hitler movement because it made funds available to them. 
For the National Socialists, the youth were an indispensible 
element in the formation of the Third Reich. 2 
This problem--the mutual attraction and collaboration be-
tween German students and the National Socialist movement-- is 
the focus of this study. I will attempt to examine in detail 
the importance of the student movement in Hitler's rise to 
power as well as the character of the transformation of aca-
demic groups under the influence of the Third Reich. This 
monograph will first survey the status, condition, and polit-
ical tendencies of the student movement as a whole between 
1920 and 1935. Then, as a case study, the Bubenreuther fra-
ternity of Erlangen will be examined in detail during these 
critical years. This fraternity typified in many respects 
the character of the student movement as a whole. 
Through this investigation, I hope to demonstrate that 
the academic youth groups were instrumental in the victory 
of H i t 1 e r i n 1 9 3 3 • Mo re o v e r , I hope to c 1 a r i f y th e some t i mes 
confusing character of the youth movement itself by distin-
guishing among its various components. A central issue of 
my study concerns the reasons and motivations for student 
alienation from the Weimar Republic. Moreover, we must ask 
ourselves why this most educated element of the German pop-
ulation found the appeal of Hitler so attractive. Finally, 
it is my intention to demonstrate the means by which student 
associations and leaders helped undermine the Republic and 
pave the way for the Nazi takeover. 
Before one can fully comprehend the developments in the 
tragic years between 1920 and 1935, however, one must examine 
in some detail the history of the student movement from its 
founding in 1815. 3 Up to this time, the only student organi-
zations which had existed were the Landmannschaften, associa-
tions which served as social cen·ters and points of communica-
tion for those students who attended a university outside 
their home states or regions. Rowdy, addicted to dueling, 
and often drunk, the students did not always appear to be 
·• h • d • d d" d 4 e1t er 1n ustr1ous or e 1cate • The Wars of Liberation and 
the destruction wrought by Napoleon brought these same stu-
dents face to face with the nationalistic ideology propagated 
by the French and the compelling possibility of German unifi-
cation. Many felt that the time had come for a change in 
Germany and that they could personally become a part of it. 
Two young men, Friedrich Friesen and Ludwig Jahn, proclaimed 
the need for the improvement of student life and the revival 
of the "German Mind". They worked for the spiritual and 
physical education of German students and developed methods 
for organizing student action and youth groups. 5 
Reverence for the Fatherland and the desire for a united 
Germany were ideals enthusiastically accepted by the academic 
youth. For the students at Jena, a step was taken toward 
further development of these goals by the foundation of the 
Deutsche Burschenschaft, or German Student Union, in 1815. 
Turning away from the more exclusive Landsmannschaften, with 
their regional sympathies, the Burschenschaft was to be a 
5 
more general student association that would revitalize the 
rude and coarse. 1 ife of the students and set forth a new pat-
tern of involved and responsible student action which would 
be undertaken not only to improve themselves but also to 
serve as an example for the nation. 6 
From Jena, the spirit of the German Student Union, its 
goals, and its objectives spread very quickly to other uni-
versities, such as Heidelberg, Giessen, and Erlangeno Its 
leaders soon concerned themselves with the creation of a 
constitution for the organization which would provide for 
the consolldation of the separate fraternity chapters at 
each university into a single national union under a demo-
cratic structureo The enthusiasm of these young leaders for 
the ideals of freedom and unity culminated in the famous 
Wartburg Festival, held at Eisenach on October 17, 1817, an 
event which marked both the fourth anniversary of the Battle 
of Leipsig and the tricentenary of the Lutheran Reformation. 7 
At the Wartburg, patriotic speeches were made, hymns 
were sung, and some of the more repugnant symbols of the 
tyranny and disunity of the German States were burnedo This 
action demonstrated a deep dissatisfaction with the division 
of Germany into thirty-nine separate states and a longing 
for liberal constitutions in those stateso To the conserva-
tive authorities, among them the Austrian Chancellor, Prince 
Metternich, the effusions at Wartburg appeared as a subver-
sive threat. The governments suddently perceived the Stu-
dent Union to be a source of disorder and revolution. Still, 
no immediate action was taken to suppress the Union, which 
was consolidated into a single all-German organization by 
'its Constitution of October 18, 1818. 8 
With this constitution, the students wanted to show 
everyone that they felt that what they were doing was not 
merely a dream but had relevance· for all Germans. They 
wanted to end the rivalry between the North and the South; 
they wanted to eradicate the division between Catholic and 
Lutheran; and they wanted to erase the distinctions between 
6 
the classes and promote brotherhood. By these and other 
methods they hoped to develop the purification of the German 
nation in custom, language, and culture. 9 
Less than five months later, however, a sensational 
crime gave the German governments a pretext for stern action 
against the Union. On March 23, 1819, Karl Ludwig Sand, who 
had been a very active member of the Burschenschaft, murdered 
the Russian agent and famous playwright, August von Kotzebueo 
To the more 1 iberal and progressive students and intellect-
uals, Kotzebue's reports to the Russian government on German 
internal affairs and his determined opposition to German 
unification branded him as an enemy of the Fatherland. He 
was detested in many quarters, and Sand felt personally 
called to remove this barrier to German aspirations. His 
subsequent trial clearly proved that he acted on his own; 
nevertheless, Metternich and the governments decided to 
punish the Burschenschaft. 10 The Karlsbad Decrees of 1819 
not only prohibited the student association but also pre-
7 
scribed punishment and prosecution for its members. On 
November 26, 1819, the Burschenschaft publicly solemnized 
its dissolution, but at the same time, the students promised 
each other that they would be true to the main tenets of 
h . u. 11 t e1r n1on. 
As early as 1820, new Burschenschaft chapters were be-
ing founded at different universities. Secret meetings 
were arranged to exchange ideas, but the close bond was no 
longer the same. Disagreements concerning the direction 
which the Burschenschaft should follow left the associations 
unable to cope with the difficulties of consolidation. 12 
Two of the most critical points of contention were 
concerned with the acceptance of Jews and foreigners into 
the organization and the retention of dueling. On one side 
were the Arminen, who represented a strong national con-
sciousness but contained important religous elements. Their 
intense love for the Fatherland, their need to be "true 
Germans", and their Christian outlook prompted their demand 
that Jews and their 11 foreign 11 ways be excluded from the 
Burschenschaft. Indeed, thi~ had been accepted as part of 
the Burschenschaft program in 1818, but it had not been 
strictly enforced and was later overridden by their opposi-
tion, the Germanen. Developing from the aristocratic ele-
ments of the student community, the Germanen represented a 
more 1 iberal and progressive standpoint. That it also em-
braced those people resolved to action is clearly shown in 
their stand on the question of dueling. This custom had 
8 
been an impo~tant part of student 1 ife in the eigtheenth 
century and continued as a tradition often pivotal in the 
preservation of personal honor. It was charged, especially 
by the Arminen, that the duel was nothing more than formal i-
zed manslaughter in which any ruffian could take part and in 
which honor was of less consequence than the number of duels 
one could boast of. The question of continuing or abolish-
ing the custom of dueling continually plagued Burschenschaft 
• 1 3 
meetings. 
The split into Arminen and Germanen began as points for 
argument among Burschenschaft members, and through the years 
these disagreements tended to form a dividing 1 ine within 
the association. The problem was recognized in the .Burschen-
schaft meeting in 1831, in which it was proclaimed that the 
organization represented the sole liberal union of all Ger-
man students at the universities. This was important for 
two reasons. First, it showed that the Burschenschaft mem-
bers recognized the ideological problems within the organiza-
tion, but did not acknowledge an official schism. Secondly, 
it indicated the ascendency of the more politically oriented 
and more active Germanen over the more philosophical Arminen. 
Although the Burschenschaft had come to agree that an ideo-
logical split did exist in their ranks, they continued to 
act rifficially as one group. 
The need for action became apparent as the dream of na-
tional freedom became more and more synonymous with the de-
sire for unification. At the Stuttgart meeting in December, 
9 
1832, the Burschenschaft agreed that a revolution was neces-
sary in order to achieve the freedom and unification of Ger-
14 
manyo Acting upon this impulse, about fifty members of the 
Student Union staged the so-called Frankfurt Insurrection in 
April, 18330 This revolt failed, however, because it was so 
badly organized and because the ~overnment had been notified 
of the impending actiono The students had planned to arrest 
the representatives to the German Confederation, take control 
of its treasury, and establish a provisional governmento 
They believed that if the revolution in Frankfurt were suc-
cessful, other cities would follow their example. 15 Many 
of the students who had been involved in this action fled 
from the city and took refuge in foreign countries, but a 
large number were arrested and punished with long prison 
sentenceso In June, 1833, the Central Investigation Commis-
sion was formed to investigate the origins of the rebellion, 
and the Burschenschaft was forbidden againo Prussia went 
even further and prohibited its subjects from attending uni-
versities which were tainted by the Burschenschaft. Another 
decree of December, 1834, subjected all members of the Stu-
dent Union to harsh criminal punishment. Because of this 
onslaught, the Burschenschaft was forced to dissolve itselfo 
This resort to direct action and the resulting counter-
attack by the governments show clearly that the Burschen-
schaft had undergone a period of deep change and development 
since the Karlsbad Decrees of 1819. The bolder spirits had 
turned their backs on Intra-organizational struggles over 
10 
ideology and had taken steps that were not originally intend-
ed or ·outlined by their cons ti tut ion. For some, this change 
bespoke a distortion of the original tenets of the Student 
Union; but for those who were ready to act--and in fact, felt 
an obligation to act--there were no other courses open to 
them. And yet, for a 11 the Burschenschaf t members, the In-
surrection of Frankfurt was a tragic event. It signaled the 
lowest ebb of the Burschenschaft, as it changed from a move-
ment for moral reform among the academic youth to a progres-
sive society forbidden by the authorities, and finally to a 
b . ' ' l' bl • · 1 • 16 su vers1ve organ1zat1on 1a e to cr1m1na prosecution. · 
At this critical point, however, the roots of the Bur-
schenschaft were not destroyed. Secret associations remain-
ed in existence, and newly founded ones took innocuous nameso 
They were aided in their struggle when in 1840 King Frederick 
William IV of Prussia proclaimed an amnesty for all those who 
had been arrested for their political activitieso This meant 
freedom for numerous Burschenschafter who had been incarcer-
ated since 1833. Although the prohibition against the Bur-
schenschaft itself remained in effect, its character was 
. • d . h 1 f d d . . l7 ma1nta1ne 1n t e new y orme stu ent assoc1at1onso 
As the year 1848 approached, these associations were 
strongly influenced by the progressive movement of bourgeois 
liberalismo While the older Burschenschaft often conceive~ 
of freedom as their aristocratic right to accentric dress 
and the perpetuation of their duels., the newer "progressive 
Burschenschaft 11 wanted a more liberal organization that 
1 1 
would be open to the emerging proletariat and merchants as 
well as students. They wanted to abandon distinctive aca-
demic attire and special rights for students and to abolish 
duelingo They did not want to be separated from the people 
of Germanyo Although the ideal of freedom had been an im-
portant tenet of the Burschenschaft from its first founding, 
it was given new dimensions of personal freedom through the 
influence of the progressive movement in the more active and 
political branches of the Burschenschaft societieso 18 
On February 22, 1848, the citizens of Paris rose up a-
gainst Louis Philippe of France. The news of the February 
Revolution spread rapidly across Europe, igniting similar 
risings in Austria, Italy, and Germany, which were generally 
based on the demand for more popular control over the govern-
ment. In Germany, this desire was connected to that of na-
tional unity; these two powerful impulses soon forced the 
II 
governments of Baden, Hannover, Wurttemberg, and other states 
to grant concessionso With the news of Metternich's fall 
from power in the spring of 1848, Frederick William IV was 
forced to promise reforms for Prussia as wel 10 19 
At the second Wartburg Festival of June 12, 1848, to 
which al 1 students were invited and at which members of the 
Frankfurt Assembly were in attendance, the Burschenschaft 
announced their reform programo Because a large number of 
delegates were former Bruschenschaft members, the students 
felt that the Frankfort National Assembly offered the best 
chance for their demands to be put into actiono The influ-
ence of the Burschenschaft was so strong that the Assembly 
was referred to as the "Parliament of Professors 11 • 20 Part 
1 2 
of this student program was a petition addressed to the Na-
tional Assembly which asked that the universities be made 
national institutions, completely free of cost to the stu-
dents. It was accompanied by a ~lea for a constitutional 
form of government free of aristocratic control for all 
Germany, since anything less would be treason against the 
people's right to rule. 21 
Quick and decisive action was needed from the Assembly 
if a constitutional government was to be formed. Unfortun-
ately, much precious time was wasted in debates among the 
various adv6cates of the viewpoints represented. By the 
time that a constitutional crown was offered to Frederick 
William of Prussia, the forces of reaction had gained the 
upper hand. After dismissing the Prussian National Assembly, 
Frederick William assisted other German governments in over-
coming the republican forces. The students and populace of 
Germany had looked to the Frankfurt National Assembly with 
great hope and enthusiasm. Equally great was their frustra-
tion and despair when the 1 iberal spirit of 1848 collapsed 
in the spring of the following year. 22 
Subsequent years were characterized by disunion in the 
Burschenschaft, which was now regarded by the governments as 
a democratic, revolutionary faction which needed to be close-
ly watched. For about two decades between 1849 and 1871, 
the Burschenschaft struggled to withstand the censure of the 
13 
reactionary German governments and to express their tradi-
tional freedomo In 1871, however, an event took place which 
was to alter fundamentally the Burschenschaft's drive for 
1 iberty and national unity. In this year Bismarck, through 
the Franco-Prussian War, established the united German Empire. 
At long last the hope and desire of Burschenschafter and the 
German populace alike were realized. Serving the Fatherland 
at peace and war became the overriding ideal. With the 
foundation of the Eisenacher Deputierten Convention (Eisen-
acher Convention of Delegates) in 1874, a new unification 
of the Burschenschaft was achieved which exemplified this 
changeo The desire for progress turned to conservatism, 
while patriotism changed to nationalism. 23 
In 1890 the Burschenschaft celebrated its seventy-fifth 
anniversary, and many of the former members attendedo An 
association for former Burschenschaft members was founded. 
These 11 old boys 11 began to support the Student Union by pro-
viding financial aid as well as building houses for the 
. • 24 
organ1zat1on. 
By 1890, many other student organizations flourished as 
wello The old Landmannschaften had survived the competition 
of the more political unions, and they were joined by others 
with little or no political connections, such as student re-
1 igious organizations, leagues of athletes, singers, sci en-
tists, and historians. They were generally organized around 
specific interest and continued to serve particular needs of 
h d · youth. 25 Th · d t th t t th t e aca em1c ey were organize a e wen y- ree 
14 
universities of the dan as well as in the numerous technical 
colleges and schools of commerce, mining, forestry, and 
. 26 
art. Certainly the old Burschenschaft did not act in a 
vacuum; they moved within a flourishing academic environment 
peopled by many groups and movements. Their goal of unifi-
cation of all students was often· hampered by governmental 
restrictions; yet even had the situation been free of this 
interference, the struggle for student unification would 
still have been great. 
Although great plans were land for the celebration of 
the centennial anniversary of the Burschenschaft, a hugh 
festival was not possible because the majority of the stu-
dents were ·away, fighting in World War I. The few that re-
mained behind held quiet and dignified ceremonies in their 
local communities. Upon returning from battle in 1918, the 
German students found it necessary to channel their original 
high hopes for victory and the Fatherland into the rebuild-
ing of a defeated nation. The Burschenschaft resumed its 
activities with the same enthusiasm but with a more mature 
political attitude. Many quickly became dissatisfied with 
the Weimar Republic and its lack of leadership. These stu-
dents turned their energies toward the ousting of the exist-
ing republic and toward a search for a strong and vigorous 
leader for their countryo 27 
To understand more clearly the forces at work in this 
century of development of the student movement, it would be 
well to choose a single and in many ways typical fraternity 
15 
and follow its progress during the period in questiono The 
Bubenreuther of Erlangen provides such an exemplary caseo 
The University of Erlangen was founded in 1743 under the 
patronage of Friedrich Margrave of Bayreutho In 1792 the 
University came under the domination of Prussia, and between 
1806 and 1810 it was under the administration of France. 
After 1810, it was governed by Bavaria. Erlangen held 
special importance in the fields of philosophy and science, 
and professors such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrick 
Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling transmitted their intellectual 
influence to both professors and students. In the first. 
decades of its existence, Erlangen had already reached a 
remarkable position in the spiritual and intellectual life 
28 
of Germany. 
Following the Napoleonic Wars, Erlangen too experlenced 
the desire for unification and reform, but these ideals were 
not so strongly proclaimed and advanced as they had been at 
Jenao Perhaps this was because of the different conditions 
a't Erlangen: it belonged to Bavaria, and the King of Bavaria 
had been one of the most trusted and valuable allies of 
Napoleon. 29 Nevertheless, on August 27, 1816 the Burschen-
schaft founded a chapter at Erlangen, though the Landsmann-
schaften continued to exist there, as they did at other uni-
versities. On December 1, 1817, this chapter became affili-
ated with the unified Deutsche Burschenschafto Near the 
university city lay a little town called Bubenreuth, which 
soon became a popular meeting place. for the Burschenschaft 
16 
of Erlangen.30 When the Student Union was prohibited by the 
Karlsbad Decrees, the Burschenschaft used Bubenreuth as their 
secret meeting place and began to cal 1 themselves 11 Buben-
reuther11o The Buenreuther of Erlangen is therefore one of 
the oldest Burschenschaft chapters in Germany.3 1 
But while most of the Burschenschaft drifted to the 
left--toward 1 iberal ism, reform, and even revolution--the 
Bubenreuther remained stubbornly conservative and intent 
upon what they considered to be the original tenets of the 
organization. They rejected political goals and programs 
and concentrated upon looking after the educational commun-
ity for the students. They held true to the motto of the 
Burschenschaft, "Honor, Freedom, Fatherland", but felt that 
these goals and ideals had been perverted for political pur-
poseso In 1850 they developed a distinct constituti~n for 
their own organization as a reendorsement of their ideals. 
Unlike many other student organizations during the days of 
repression, the Burbenreuther was well-1 iked by the profes-
so rs. In addition, former members of the Bubenreuther were 
always welcome in the student meetingso As far as these 
students were concerned, when a student joined the Buben-
reuther, he joined not merely for his educational career 
but for his entire 1 ifeo It is no wonder that during the 
11 progressive era" the Bubenreuther was considered by the 
other Burschenschaften to be conservative. On the other 
hand, these conservative convictions came to form an impor-
17 
tant influence on the Burschenschaft itselfo 32 
This conservative program was characterized by its love 
for the Fatherland, sexual continence, and a high regard for 
scholastic pursuits and traditional objectiveso Through 
connections with other universities, their ideals became 
wel 1 known as the "Bubenreuther Program 11 0 33 By 1870, many 
Burschenschaft chapters were concentrating their efforts on 
local affairs, student needs, and moral and academic reformo 
This resurfacing of traditional objectives and the warm re-
ception which the 11 Bubenreuther Program 11 encountered in many 
universities led the Bubenreuther of Erlangen to work toward 
the much cherished goal of unifying the student organizations. 
In order to achieve this goal, the Bubenreuther took part in 
the Eisenach Convention of 18700 The time may have seemed 
right for the formation of a united front; instead, however, 
the deliberations led only to argu~ents and dissensiono The 
old controversy over the question of dueling and political 
involvement rose again to plague the Conferenceo Whereas 
many chapters felt the Bubenreuther and its program to be 
frustratingly unprogressive the Bubenreuther found its op-
ponents to be obsessed with secondary objectives.3 4 
At the Al lgemeine Deputierten Convention (General Con-
vention of Deputies) in 1882, the Bubenreuther tried once 
again to effect a union. For two. years they labored, but 
finally left in disappointment. It was not possible to 
form a union of all the Burschenschaft that would accept 
the 11 Bubenreuther Program" as its owno This conflict was 
to some extent resolved by the formation of the Union of 
the Old Burschenschaften in 1890. This association of 
18 
Bubenreuther and their advocates was renamed the 11 Red Union 11 
in 18970 Within this group, the Bubenreuther was able to 
realize their program.35 
During World War I student life at Erlangen, as at other 
universities, was virtually suspendedo By the beginning of 
1917, only 157 students were enrolledo Those few who did 
not go to war tried to keep the Bubenreuther together, but 
experienced considerable difficulty in reviving its activityo 
Their house was used until December 31, 1918, as a military 
hospital. Despite these problems and differences in atti-
tudes between veteran and non-veterans, the fraternity was 
still in existence when the Weimar Republic was formed.3 6 
Even though the Bubenreuther were forced to form a union 
that included only a part of the student organizations, it 
displayed many common traits with the other associationso 
The conflict within the Burschenschaft could not erase the 
long years of development and shared history of the differ-
ent groups; student life had changed dramatically from its 
Landmannschaften days as a result of their efforts. Reform-
ed ideas of how a student should 1 ive and what should be his 
concerns spread throughout Germany. Student associations 
had provided significant support for the national movement 
for unificationo Even in their internal struggles, the 
Burschenschaft groups showed themselves to be vital organi-
19 
zations which continued to capture the imagination of German 
students and to. serve not only as their image of themselves, 
but as their means of taking actiono 
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CHAPTER I I 
STUDENTS IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 
In order to understand and appreciate the attitude of 
the German students toward the Weimar Republic, it is neces-
ary to review briefly the history of that period. The situ-
ation In Germany after World War I was marked by economic 
and social dislocation as well as internal strife and rest-
lessness. The disagreements among the various political 
parties over national and international policies of the coun-
try caused great uncertainty and concern within the popula-
tion at largeo Germany after World War I lacked a political 
consensus. Instead, there were five major political parties, 
ranging from extreme communism to the most reactionary monar~ 
chism, vying for control of the state, as well as a host of 
minor splinter groups, each with its own panacea for the 
problems of the defeated nation. 
On the left, the Social Democratic Party (SOD) was the 
strongest, with 165 representatives in the Constituent As-
sembly of 416 members which was elected in January, 1919. 
The SOD followed a pol icy of moderate democratic socialism; 
it was the cornerstone of the Republ ic. 1 Often al 1 ied with 
the Socialists were the 75 representatives of the Democratic 
Party, representing the ideology of western liberalismo The 
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Center Party, with 91 members in the Assembly, was chiefly 
concerned with questions of religion, but could usually be 
'counted upon to support the newly established Republic. The 
Peoples Party, the party of big business and imperialism, 
held only 19 seats in the Assembly, while the National Party, 
1 a r g e 1 y cons er v a t i v e , an t i - Rep u b ·1 i can , an d h i g h 1 y n a t i on a 1 -
istic, counted 440 Still, at the beginning of its troubled 
1 ife, the Republic could count upon the support of about 
three quarters of the German electroate. The gradual ero-
sion of this support and the emergence of extremist and 
totalitarian movements on both the left and the right in the 
1920s would spell the doom of the Republic. 2 
Th i s p·o 1 i t i ca 1 i n s ta b i 1 i t y res u 1 t e d i n rev o 1 u t i on a r y 
attacks from both the right-and left-wing political factions. 
In December, 1918, the Spartacists, a Communist oriented 
group led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, staged a 
revolt in Berl in to protest against the supposed dictator-
ship of the working masses by the political parties. Found-
ed during the war, the Spartacists were loosely associated 
with the Independent Socialists (USPD), but the revolution 
at Berl in was an independent political act. This revolt was 
marked by six days of bloody street fighting with the Free 
Corps Volunteers, a reactionary group drawn from the remnants 
of the Imperial Army, united mainly by their hatred of Com-
munism. This internal fighting and civil disturbance, in 
addition to the question of the Treaty of Versailles, made 
it imperative that a government be established. 3 
25 
An attempt to establish a provisional government ha.d 
been made in Nobember, 1918, but this collapsed in late 
December. On February 6, 1919, the National Assembly met 
at Weimar and completed a Constitution for the new Republic 
the following August. Under the chancellorship of Philippe 
Scheidemann, a Social Democrat, a coa 1 i ti on cabinet contain-
ing Social Democrats, Democrats and Ca tho 1 i c Center ministers 
met to face the birth pains of the Republic. 4 
It was indeed a difficult birth; the Republic had many 
problems to solve if it was to survive. Perhaps the most 
important was the question of signing the Treaty of Versail-
1 es. Shou 1 d this new Re pub 1 i c sign such a document and as-
sume sole blame for the war, or not? Should Germany make a 
restitution for the war by the payment of large sums in re-
paration, or not? These were the major problems facing this 
fledgling government. Besides the humiliating terms of the 
Treaty, other provisions restricted the size of the German 
Army and Navy, allowed the occupation of the Rhineland for 
15 years or longer, and ceded the Saar district to the great 
advantage of France. These obviously debilitating dictates 
were accepted by the government, and the Treaty of Versailles 
was signed under protest by the Weimar Republic on June 28, 
1919. 5 
This action by the government caused great consterna-
tion throughout the country, and by 1920 disillusionment ran 
rampant among the people. Revolution and rebellion were 
once more the order of the day. Much of this unrest showed 
26 
itself in a wave of assassinations of political figures. In 
February, 1919,. Kurt Eisner, the Prime Minister of Bavaria, 
was murdered. His death, which caused much excitement at 
Munich, paved the way for the establishment of a Communist 
Soviet Republic of Bavaria in April, 1919. 6 Even more im-
portant assassinations occurred between 1921 and 19220 On 
August 26, 1921, Mathias Erzberger, the Minister of Finance, 
was killedo Then, on June 14, 1922, Walther von Rathenau, 
the Foreign Minister, was assassinatedo These assassina-
tions can be considered as overt political expressions of 
dissatisfaction with the Weimar Republic. 7 
Another event which can be interpreted as direct action 
against the Republic took place during the chaotic years from 
1919 to 19230 This was the "Kapp Putsch". On March 12, 1920, 
Wolfgang Kapp, a Prussian bureaucrat, along with General 
Walther von Luttwitz and his troops, occupied Berl in. The 
government fled from Berlin to Stuttgart, and Kapp declared 
himself Chancelloro However, the various government minis-
ters, officials, and even the Reichswehr refused to work 
with him. This caused Kapp to resign on March 17, after a 
reign of only five days. 8 
Although the Putsch failed for Kapp, it provoked a gen-
eral strike throughout the country. The Communists took ad-
vantage of this situation. At first, the Communists had su~­
ported the government, but after the Putsch, they expanded 
the general strike into a Communist- insurrection in the Ruhr 
district. This strike was so dangerous that the government 
was forced to send Reichswehr into the Ruhr area to crush 
the "Red Army".9 
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This Ruhr rebellion combined with the generally unset-
tled condition of the country, the rising prices, and cur-
rency inflation influenced the election of the Reichtag 
in June, 1920. In 1919, the Weimar Coalition had received 
over seventy-five percent of the votes, but after the trials 
and troubles of 1919 and 1920, it obtained less than half of 
the Reichstag seats. The government, under Konstantine 
Fehrenbach, no longer had majority support. Because of the 
instabi 1 i ty of the government and the Al 1 ied demand for a 
reparation payment of 132 bill ion gold marks, Fehrenbach re-
signed in April, 1921. Josef Wirth then assumed leadership 
of the government and continued to lead the Republic down 
. 1 h d d d" 10 its ong ar roa to 1saster. 
One crucial step on this road was the acceptance by 
Wirth of the ultimatum of London, which stipulated that up-
on default of reparations, the Al 1 ies would be al lowed to 
occupy Germany's most important industrial district, the 
Ruhr. Germany was unable to pay the exhorbitant reparation 
demandsf so on January 11, 1923, a combined force of French 
and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr. The government put 
into effect Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno's strategy of "passive 
resistance" to the army of occupation. In effect, the Ruhr 
district was boycotted so that the French and Belgian gov-
ernment would receive absolutely no advantage from their oc-
upation. Trains were prevented from entering the district 
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and those already there were forbidden to leaveo This was 
done primarily to stop the transportation of coal, one of 
the Ruhr's important exports. Because the Ruhr was shut 
down, the government had to support the unemployed Ruhr pop-
ulation. This proved to be a great financial burden for the 
German government, and the overall economic situation of 
G f 11 • 1 • h 11 ermany e to pieces a ong wit currency. 
It became necessary for workmen to receive their wages 
several times during the dayo This would enable them to ex-
change their marks for something of value before their money 
became worthlesso In the country, the farmers refused to 
take the mark and would only work in exchange for commodi-
tieso Inflation was so pronounced that by November ·15, 1923, 
the rate of exchange was 4,200,000,000,000 marks for one 
dol laro 12 
As things are always darkest before the dawn, the ail-
ing Republic received a shot in the arm with the chancellor-
ship of Gustav Stresemann. While Stresemann was trying to 
control the inflation, he was hit by new political insurrec-
tions. In October, 1923, the Communists staged rebellions 
in Munich and Berl in. In November, 1923, Adolf Hitler 
started his political activities in Bavaria with the so-
called "Beer Hall Putsch". These two events will be discus-
sed in detail later. 
Stresemann was Chancellor for only one hundred days 
during the fall of 1923, but he continued to influence the 
government as Foreign Minister until 19290 He built a 
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coalition of Social Democrats, Center Party members, Demo-
crats and representatives of his own party, and immediately 
took action to stabi 1 i ze the currency. First, he halted the 
passive resistence in the Ruhr district and then established 
a new currency, the Rentenmark. 13 By negotiating a revi-
sion of the reparation schedule ·under the "Dawes Plan 11 in 
1924, Stresemann brought Germany the financial support of 
the United Stateso This fresh flow of currency helped to 
stabilize the Rentenmark and rationalized industry through 
d • • 1 4 necessary mo ern1zat1on. 
But the most significant of Stresemann 1 s actions was 
.in the realm of foreign policy. The Treaty of Versailles 
had placed Germany in political isolation, and Stresemann 1 s 
primary goal was that of regaining the respect of the Euro-
pean powers and easing the hateful atmosphere between France 
and Germany. In 1925, he arranged the conference at Locarno 
where Germany and France mutually guaranteed the permanence 
of their frontiers. 15 Without doubt, the strongest period 
of the Weimar Republic was from 1924 to 1929, under the 
guidance of Gustav Stresemanno In economics and especially 
. f . ff • bl h. d 16 1n ore1gn a airs nota e successes were ac 1eve • 
II 
From 1928 to 1930, Hermann Muller of the SPD led a 
government determined to build upon this success. But 
II 
Muller inherited the Great Depression, and the hostili-
ties and enmities of the past now emerged in this critical 
atmosphere to destroy the basis of parliamentary 1 ife. 17 
II 
Mul ler 1 s SPD government failed for a number of reasons. 
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The party had been unable to enlarge its image from that of 
a l a b o r p a r t y t.o th a t o f a b r o a d l y Rep u b 1 i ca n o n e ; i t w o u l d 
not remove the barriers between itself and the rest of the 
German society. In addition, the Social Democrats had been 
unable to agree with the People's Party on an increase in 
the unemployment insurance contributions of workers and em-
ployers in order to cover the rising deficit in federal un-
employment funds. An underlying cause of their failure was 
the growing lack of confidence in the parliamentary system 
itself, especially as the economic crisis worsened in the 
D • 18 epress1on. 
With the death of President Ebert in 1925, it became 
necessary to find a strong candidate with great popular ap-
peal. They chose Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. He 
was not well suited for the job. An ex-monarchist, he had 
no understanding for democratic governmento His major 
abilities were military in nature, and such problems as 
economics, politics, and financial crises were beyond his 
competencyo Being seventy-eight, he was too old to control 
other younger and more ambitious pol iticianso Also, while 
he remained president until his death in August, 1934, he 
was merely a figureheado 19 
Many "presidential decisions" were really those of Gen-
eral Kurt von Schleicher, whose official position was Chief_ 
of the Minister's Office. Schleicher was no friend of the 
Weimar democracy. He found it indecisive and devisive and 
felt that the development of an authoritarian government 
was the only constructive step. He became the dominating 
force in German domestic politics and determined the ap-
pointment of the chacellors between 1930 and 1932. His 
great political power was a result of his influence over 
the aging von Hindenburg. 20 
II 
3 ] 
In 1930, Muller's governmen·t felt, and Schleicher sup-
II 
ported Heinrich Bruning, a Catholic veteran of World War I, 
II 
as Chancellor. Bruning went back to a more authoritarian 
form of government. During his administration the 11 presi-
dential cabinet" became the actual ruling body. The govern-
ment depended less and less on the support of a Reichstag 
majority and more and more on the influence and abilities 
of the Preiident. In this case, because of Schleicher 1 s 
power over Hindenburg, this meant that actual dictatorial 
II 
powers were given to Schleicher and through him, to Bruning. 
This appeared formally lawful under Article Forty-Eight of 
the Constitution, which gave the President the right to is-
II 
sue emergency legislation. Bruning attempted to alleviate 
the Depression by means of deflation. He did this by cut-
ting wages and inaugurating a program of austerity for the 
government. Under this pol icy, unemployment increased from 
2.7 mill ion in April, 1930, to 5.7 million in May, 1932. 
He had become increasingly unpopular with the urban working 
class, who objected strongly to his deflationary pol icy and 
his protection of agrarian interests through the use of 
high import tariffs. Finally, with unemployment so high 
II 
and dissatisfaction so widespread, Bruning was ousted from 
32 
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the chancellorship on May 5, 1932. 
Hindenburg then appointed Franz von Papen to the chan-
cellorship. The struggle for power between Chancellor Papen 
and Schleicher was intense, as it was Schleicher 1 s goal to 
bring about the fall of Papen 1 s government. Thus, the 
political fate of Germany rested in the hands of these three 
men: one whose physical and mental capabilities were un-
suited for his position, and two subordinates whose primary 
interests were personal rather than national. In order to 
meet the problems of the Depression, Papen wanted to estab-
lish a military dictatorship; however, this plan was vetoed 
by Schleicher, who argued that it would lead to both a Nazi 
and Communist rebel! ion. Papen was removed from office, 
and Schleicher tried his hand at the chancellorship. He 
too failed to deal effectively with the situation, and his 
cabinet collapsed on January 28, 1933. 22 
The rise of the NSDAP and Hitler's accession to power 
paralleled the decline of the Weimar Republic. The NSDAP 
started out as a small party confined to Bavaria, as a re-
action against the left-wing uprisings taking place there. 
The party was weak and poorly developed until after 1923, 
when it began to grow slowly outside the geographical boun-
daries of Bavaria. I n May , 1 9 2 4 , the pop u l a r i t y of the 
NSDAP was seen in the Reichstag elections. The NSDAP and 
its fringe groups collected 2mil1 ion votes, probably as 
a result of the inflation. During the period of 1924-1928 
the NSDAP suffered a slight setback. The situation in Ger-
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many had stabi 1 ized, and the Weimar Republic retained the 
confidence of the voters. 
In 1929, the Great Depression began, and the NSDAP be-
gan to expando The party offered no coherent program of 
economic policies but blamed the existing conditions on the 
"Criminals of 1918 11 , the Jews, and the Treaty of Versailles, 
rather than advocating new measuresa But such was the dis-
satisfaction with the old policies that by 1930 the NSDAP 
was the second largest party in the Reichstag. Between 
1930 and 1932, the NSDAP, with Hitler as its leader, gained 
many new members and voters, mostly from the disgruntled 
youth. These young people, eligible to vote for the first 
time, were totally disenchanted with the corrupt parlia-
mentary system exemplified in the last days of the Republ ico 
A change was needed, and the Nazi party offered such a 
changeo It appeared as 11 a movement which promised every-
thing and was responsible for nothing 11 • 23 As the Republic 
fell apart between 1930 and 1932, Hitler's power grew, and 
the alternative he offered became more tempting until, fin-
ally in 1933, he was given command of the government, and 
the NSDAP 1 s ascendancy towards political control became a 
• 2L1 
rea 1 1 ty. 
Neither Papen or Schleicher had been effective. Their 
plans for an authoritarian government had achieved no more 
than the procession of coalitions that they had so abhored 
in the Weimar Republ lea In desperation, Papen had urged 
Hindenburg to appoint Hitler to the Chancellorship. Hinden-
34 
burg was against the move, holding out for several months, 
because he was afraid that Hitler's cabinet would lead to a 
11 party dictatorship". However, on January 30, 1933, Hinden-
burg gave Hitler the Chancellorship, thus beginning the Nazi 
. . G 25 reign 1n ermany. 
As these tragic developments unfolded, the students of 
Germany were not only acutely conscious of political develop-
ments but often deeply and actively involved as well. Most 
were hostile to the Republic, largely as a consequence of 
their postwar situation. It was particularly difficult for 
the student veterans to adjust to the situation in the post-
war years. With great enthusiasm they had gone to war, un-
conditionally willing to defend their country to the endo 
W i th a l mos t ch i I d i sh tr us t they be 1 i eve d i n the Ka i s er and 
his country. How disppointing and painful must have been 
the sense of defeat for the student to return from the 
battlefield to find a torn Fatherland! Their common experi-
ence of the trenches resulted in a desire for togetherness, 
26 for a close comradship among the student veterans. 
The confusing situation in Germany after World War 
was instrumental in developing the restlessness of the Ger-
man students. The number of students enrolled in universi-
ties grew from 25,000 in 1918 to 112,000 in 1919, and con-
tinued to grow to 126,000 in 1923. Organized student groups 
that survived the First World War included the Landsmann-
schaft, the Burschenschaft, and the Christian Unions. The 
largest of these groups was the Deutsche Burschenschafto 
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This organization had about 6,000 members in 1919, and grew 
to 11,600 members by 1931. The students who chose not to 
affiliate with the older organizations were called the Frei-
studentenschaft (Free Student Body). They attempted to or-
ganize before the war, but chose to remain very loosely af-
fi 1 iated.27 The war experience, the still existing desire 
for a united Fatherland, together with the desire to obtain 
a voice in the functioning of the universities gave these 
d h • h d d . 28 Th stu ents t e impetus t ey nee e to organ1zeo e war ex-
perience was particularly influential, since 90% of the stu-
dents were veterans of World War I. Because of the large 
percentage of students who had served, they were important 
in the leadership of the student movement until 1923, when 
many of these veterans began to leave the universities. 29 
The younger students had less emotional involvement with the 
united fatherland question, and so it was left to the stu-
dents who had been veterans to lead any drive for the pol it-
ical union of all German speaking peopleo These students 
went to war with the idea of a unified Germany. However, 
Germay under the Republic of Weimar did not appear to them 
as their dream about their Fatherland. The most mi 1 i tant 
of these veterans were willing to become members of the Free 
Corps, and thus participated in the armed clashes in the 
streets between the radicals and the government forceso The 
Free Corps came into existence because of the reluctance of 
th e reg u 1 a r f o r c es to s ho o t a t th e mobs i n th e s t re e ts , 
which included many women and children. 30 
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Generally, the students as a whole were opposed to the 
Weimar Republic as a republic per se and also hostile to-
ward its specific policies. Because of political goals of 
the students and the goals of the political parties were 
different, the student factions of the political parties 
remained small and uninfluential. There were attempts to 
build up student membership in the major parties, but their 
numbers were too small to be an important factor. 31 Most 
of the students tended to sympathize with the right-wing 
parties. 32 The new Republic was inconsistent with the 
political sympathies of the students. As an institution 
the Republic was something with no historical precedent in 
Germany. The opposition to the Republic was intensified 
because of the Versailles Treaty and its acceptance by the 
government. The students were opposed to the Treaty be-
cause of the unreasonable demands of the Allies, and more 
importantly, the acceptance by Germany of the entire blame 
for the war. 33 
The students who were interested in organizing in 
order to enhance their political influence were given en-
couragement by the Prussian Ministry of Culture, which 
recognized their right to organize. The Al lgemeine Deutsche 
II 
Studentenausschusse (General German Students Committee or 
ASTA) already existed in a loosely organized form at some 
universities. 34 The ASTA was a type of student parliament, 
with representatives from individual student groups. As the 
ASTA was already in existence, it found itself in a leader-
37 
ship role to promote a nationwide organization which would 
include students who had not previously been organized. The 
students decided that the best way to begin was to call a 
conference to which all students, including Austrian stu-
dents, were invited, regardless of whether they were organi-
zed or not. Between July 17 and 19, 1919, 147 delegates re-
presenting student interests from all German universities 
met at W~rzburg. 35 
At this meeting, besides choosing the name of Deutsche 
Studentenschaft (German Student Body), the students tried 
primarily to define their roles and duties in the area of 
the cultural, socio-economic, and political future of the 
country. 36 At this meeting, it was decided that those el i-
gible for membership would be students of German origin 
whose native language was German. There was among the stu~ 
dents the agreement that the Austrians be included, even 
though this was against the provisions of the Treaty of 
Versailles. It was decided that the headquarters of ·the 
organization would be in Berl in. The delegates went back 
to their own universities with the assignment of establish-
ing a chapter of the German Student Body at each and elect-
ing a new ASTA, or Student Parl iament.37 
II 
At Wurzburg, the 
decision was made to have annual meetings with representa-
tives from the ASTAs of the different universities. 
While the Deutsche Studentenschaft was accepted by the 
government as a legitimate organization, the apparent unity 
of 1919 was illusory and did not last very long. ldeologi-
cal disputes soon tore the movement apart. 38 These disputes 
II 
focussed on what has been called the 11 volkisch idea 11 , a 
somewhat nebulous term which requires further explanationo 
The concept of the German 11 Volk 11 developed gradually from a 
somewhat vague appreciation that the Germanic peoples con-
stituted a distinct and identifi~ble group based upon re-
1 igion, cul tu re and raceo It culminated in the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries with the notion that 
there existed a unity of the common will or spirit of the 
II 
people. 11 Volkisch 11 thought came to emphasize the necessity 
for building a unified German nation around its common rac-
ial, Christian, and cultural background. Frequently, those 
who shared this notion called for a leader who symbolized 
the common national will to become the exarnple and focal 
p o i n t f o r t h e c r y s t a l 1 i z a t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l c o mm u n i ty i n 
which there is a union of all human wills and endeavorso 
Philosophers such as Hegel contributed the idea that the 
traditional characteristics of the German people as well as 
their national policical constitution manifested world-
spirit. Fichte contributed the idea that there should be 
a union of all human wills in a universal community, ioeo, 
in the German nation.39 Others suggested that the spirit 
of a particular nation could never be comprehended by a 
II 
member of another, thus predisposing 11 Volkisch 11 thinkers 
toward anti-semitism. The philosophies of these and other 
men prevaded the educational institutions from the time of 
the wars of liberation. Often in distorted and simplistic 
form, they contributed to a rather mystical cult stressing 
II 
German self-identity and unity of spirit. 11 Volkisch1.1 
thinking was especially pervasive within the ranks of stu-
dents and student organizations like the Burschenschaft 
during the period of the Empire. 40 
The World War, the Treaty of Versailles and the re-
39 
birth of Romanticism gave impetus to the reassertion of the 
II 
volkisch movemento The movement excluded the Jews, viewing 
them as foreigners and therefore not part of the "German 
landscape". This opinion became prevalent in the German 
youth and later among the students of the university. As 
the movement grew, anti-Semitism permeated the elementary 
schools. So far, in fact, that instead of child games of 
"cowboys and indians" there were games of "Aryans and Jews". 
Discrimination against the Jews became an intricate part 
of childhood, and as children matured and entered the uni-
versities it became a goal of the German students to exclude 
Jews from their environmento The Jews were forced to seek 
out those universities where they could study free from 
pressures of discrimination; they were also advised to learn 
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self-defense to protect themselves from the "Aryans". 
Anti-Semitism was indeed strong among the student pop-
ulation in Germany. Many examples can be cited. Assassina-
ti on of Jewish political figures such as Kurt Eisner and 
Walter von Rathenau were met by unconcern and remarks such 
as "Who cares, one Jew less", by the students. The students 
responded enthusiastically to the NSDAP demand that Jewish-
owned businesses be eliminated and only German industries 
be allowed to operate. Jewish students, those lucky enough 
to attend the universities, were excluded from the univer-
sity sponsored celebrations and memorials. 42 In 1926 
National Socialist students were already demanding that the 
number of Jewish students be res·tricted, which meant that 
Jewish applicants must take and pass more difficult exams 
than the other students. 43 Many professors supported the 
anti-Semitic attitude of the students, being concerned that 
not too many Jewish students or professors enter the German 
universities. 44 All of these points clearly show that the 
II 
11 volkisch idea 11 and its corollary anti-Semitism, v ere well 
es ta bl i shed notions among German students long before Adolf 
Hitler made it a national characteristic. 
II 
The 11 volkisch idea 11 , including the Jewish question, 
split the German Student Body. This split was a result of 
differing priorities among German students rather than a 
fundamental difference in beliefs. On the one side there 
stood those who were most concerned about economic aid for 
students and their role in the universities; they remained 
within the Deutsche Studentenschaft. Those who considered 
II 
the 11 volkisch idea 11 the most important student issue broke 
away from the organization. The students from Austria as 
well as those affi 1 iated with the old Burschenschaft were 
particularly adamant against admitting Jewish students to 
II 
the organization. At a meeting in Gottingen in 1920, a ma-
jority of German Student Body delegates founded a separate 
41 
organization called the Hochschulring deutscher Art (German 
Academic Circle), which became the collecting point for 
II 
those students of pronounced 11 volkisch 1' sympathies. Many 
of these individuals who insisted upon the exclusion of 
Jews from student organizations continued to maintain their 
membership in various Bruschenschaft or Landsmannschaft 
chapters as well as in the German Student Body itself. 4 5 
The German Academic Circle enjoyed increasing influ-
ence, and by 1924 it dominated most of the student parlia-
ments. Activities of the Circle such as supporting Hitler 
in his Beer Hal 1 Putsch helped increase membership as well 
as render their ideology acceptable to a growing number of 
students. 46 
There was another controversy within the German Student 
Body which concerned the status of both Jewish and Austrian 
students. This controversy centered around the problem of 
who was a "German•• and who was not; it was raised at each 
annual meeting of the Deutsche Studentenschaft by the Ger-
m~n Academic Circle. Their position was that Jews were not 
German and therefore had no right to membership in the Ger-
man Student Body, while Austrians were German and had this 
righto The Austrian chapters of the Deutsche Studenten-
II 
schaft adhered to the volkisch, anti-Semitic views of the 
German Academic Circle. The Academic Circle wanted to make 
h • d l' 11 G · • · 4 7 t 1s accepte po icy at a erman un1vers1t1es. 
However, Karl Heinrich Becker, Prussian Minister of 
Culture, was against adopting this pol icy for Germany, and 
42 
refused to accept the Constitution of the German Student 
Body which included this policy. Each year a constitution 
was proposed, and each year he rejected it until finally in 
1927, after seven years of argument, Becker issued an ulti-
matum. He demanded that the Student Body accept as members 
al 1 German students, including Jews, without regard to rac-
ial or ethnic originso 11 Foreign 11 students could be admit-
ted to local chapters if that particular university approved 
of such action. If the Austrian chapters of the German Stu-
dent Body would allow Jews to membership, then Becker would 
continue to consider them part of the German organization. 
If not, then by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles, which 
declared Austria a separate country, Becker would consider 
the Austrians as "foreigners 11 and thus ineligible to belong 
to the German Deutsche Studentenschaft. As a result of his 
pol icy against anti-Semitism, Becker was considered as a 
11 Jew-lover 11 and a 11 November criminal 11 by the students. 1• 8 
The extent of anti-Semitism within the German Student 
Body can be gauged by the students' vote on this issue on 
November 30, 1927. Becker lost by a vast majority, 77% of 
the students voting against his proposal. Under his author-
ity as culture minister, Becker declared the German Student 
Body to be unacceptable to the government as a formal or-
ganization and withdrew al 1 government supporto Since only 
those organizations recognized by the government could re-
ceive dues from their members, this left the association 
with no way to finance itself. It also lost the right to 
be consulted about changes in pol icy at the universities, 
and though it continued to exist, it lost most of its power 
II 
and importance. The volkisch group, the German Academic 
Circle, having now a clear majority of students on its side, 
rose in power to become the most important student organiza-
• 49 t 1 on. 
Though the general conditions of the Republic began to 
II 
improve after 1924, the volkisch movement continued to grow, 
and the opposition of students to the Republic became more 
active and vocal. In 1926, the Nazi Party founded a student 
auxiliary, the National Sozial istische deutsche Studenten 
Bund (National Socialist German Student League) or NSDSTB. 50 
Working di~ectly with the Party, the League joined the Bur-
schenschaft and the Academic Circle in their support of 
. h . l". 51 r 1 g t-w 1 n g po 1 c 1 es. The goal of the NSDSTB was to gain 
control of the student parliaments and thus the universit-
ies.52 This objective was enormously facilitated by the 
effects of the Great Depression after 1929. 53 The Burschen-
schaft and other student organizations continued to retain 
their separate identity until 1935, when by Hitler's decree 
they were all absorbed into the NSDSTB.5 4 
To understand this rapid development of nationalistic 
tendencies among the students, several points of opposition 
to the Weimar Republic should be examined. The Treaty of 
Versailles was a crushing blow to the German population as 
a whole and caused a deep bitterness among the students. 
The terms of the Treaty were sharply criticized by the stu-
dents, and they appealed to the government not to sign it 
because it would rob Germany of both opportunities for fu-
ture expansion and its honor. The Republic's acceptance of 
the Treaty created a critical attitude on the part of the 
students. 55 Especially they resented the imposition of full 
responsibility for the war on Germany. To demonstrate their 
hatred of the Treaty and all it stood for, students held 
annual demonstrations against it on the anniversary of its 
acceptanceo In 1927, the demonstrators· drew up a resolution 
which called for the revision of the Treaty to eliminate 
particularly its assertion of German war guil t.5 6 
It was but natural then for the students to welcome 
and actively support the National Socialist campaign against 
the Young Plan in 19290 The Young Plan prescribed a new 
program for German's reparation payments, but the students 
interpreted this new formula as slavery for the German peo-
ple and their future generations. A petition was sent to 
President Hindenburg asking for his consent for a plebiscite 
o·n the Plan. It was asserted in the petition that Hinden-
burg's acceptance of the Young Plan would mean a permanent 
national disaster for Germany. The signing of this contract 
by the aging President was again proof to the students that 
the Weimar Republic could not be trusted. Hindenburg had 
been honored and admired greatly by the students; they ex-
pected him to help and support their positiono His disap-
pointing action caused the students to lose confidence in 
the President, and made him look like a helpless, powerless 
45 
old man. 57 
Another issue which alienated the students from the 
Republic was the outcome of the Ruhr occupation. The gov-
ernment had asked the students for their cooperation in its 
passive resistance policy of 1923, and the students enthusi-
astically responded. This first appeal by the Republic to 
resist the constarit pressures by the Allies restored some-
what the students' hope for political changeo How di sap-
pointed they were when Stresemann decided to terminate pas-
sive resistance in 1924! This called for another resolution: 
The academic youth under no circumstances would tolerate 
slavery of the German people at any time in the future from 
this day forth! An urgent appeal was made to every .German 
student to realize his duty to fight for the Fatherland 
movement. 58 
Moreover, the students were seriously hurt by infla-
tion, and this situation did not alter significantly when 
the economy showed a faint upswing after 1924. 59 This is 
best shown by a few comparisons. In ·1921, the average 
monthly student income was 520 marks, compared to 896 marks 
earned by a common laborero In 1925, after the inflation, 
students had an average income of only 75 marks per month, 
whereas the laborer averaged 264 marks. The student's 
1 iving conditions were atrocious, worse than any other 
class of societyo Germany's construction business was at 
a virtual standstill after the war, and it was almost impos-
sible for the students to find living quarterso When con-
struction slowly resumed, the scarce housing was priced a-
bove the studen.t 1 s limit. It was not uncommon to find stu-
dents sleeping in train stations or deserted army barracks. 60 
In addition, the shortage of funds caused a health problemo 
The young men were undernourished; a general medical check-
up in 1925 showed that 50% of them were suffering from mal-
nutrition. In 1921, 1o7% of students suffered from tuber-
culosis, and an additional 8.7% were suspected of harboring 
the disease. The Weimar Republic promised but did not pro-
vide relief for these problems. 61 This meant the students 
had to resort to their own initiative to ease their plight. 
In 1921, the German Student Body founded the 11 Wirtschaft-
shilfe 11 , an economic aid program. Funded mainly through 
donations by industries and some foreign nations, the as-
sistance came in the form of money, food, clothing, and 
h . 62 ousrng. 
The only recourse for most students, however, was to 
seek employment in addition to his studies. This created 
a new phenomenon, the 11 Werkstudent 11 , or student laborer. 
Up to this time it was uncommon for a student to hold a 
job, since the majority of the students between 1918 and 
1933 came from the middle class. But it was precisely 
this group which was hit hardest both by inflation and de-
pression, and there was little financial help for the stu-
dents from home. By the summer of 1923, approximately 43% 
of all students were working. The .inflation put an end to 
this improvement, and until the economic situation had suf-
47 
ficiently improved, jobs were scarce for students. Of 
course this shortl ived security vanished entirely with the 
beginning of the world economic depression. By the summer 
of 1930 only about 7% of the students were employed. 6 3 The 
National Socialist Party saw its chance. Using the NSDSTB 
to distribute financial and employment aid to needy students, 
assistance from the Party persuaded many students to view 
Hitler as a savior and to join his movement as the only way 
to get our of their misery. 64 Thus, its ideology, the pro-
spect of financial aid, the hatred of the Republic, and the 
charisma of Hitler himself were all reasons for the popu-
larity of National Social ism among the students. It seemed 
that there were no political alternatives to the Nazi party. 
By examining a specific chapter of the old Burschenschaft--
the Bubenreuther--each of these factors will be shown in 
greater detail. 
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CHAPTER I 11 
BUBENREUTHER AND BAVARIAN POLITICS, 
1918-1933 
The state of Bavaria held a unique position within the 
Weimar Republic. Considered the most politically active 
state, Bavaria was also the state most disrupted by inter-
nal political and social disorders and most prone to extre-
mist movements of both the right and the left. On April 7, 
1919, the proclamation of the Bavarian Soviet Republic sig-
naled the high point of the extreme leftist phase of her 
postwar history. This regime, which lasted only until May 
5, provoked a right-wing reaction which was to have a great 
influence on the German Reich as well as the Nazi movement. 
The early National Socialist Party had its origins in Bavar-
ia and attracted nationwide attention as a result of the 
Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. These events significantly in-
fluenced the historical development and decline of the 
Republic. 
Besides its procl ivlty toward extremism, Bavaria always 
tried to influence the federal government in Berl in with its 
own brand of provincial politics. One might characterize 
the Bavarian political attitude as that of 11 the mouse that 
roared": a small state within a larger political complex 
which sought to force its policies on the larger government. 
52 
53 
This, of course, was easier to plan than to do. The politi-
cal position of Bavaria and the other individual states was 
laid out in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. The 
individual states enjoyed autonomy in certain areas: educa-
tion, police, etc., but were required to maintain a republi-
can f o rm o f gov e r nm en t 1 i k e the 'Re i ch • Mo re o v e r , th e m i 1 i -
tary, the judicial, and the financial systems were to be 
controlled by the Reich, not by the states themselves. 1 
This situation, especially the financial aspect, caused 
great dissatisfaction with the Weimar Republic. Bavaria 
used financial problems, especially those arising out of the 
reparation payments due under the Treaty of Versailles, and 
tax-related problems as opportunities to work against the 
politics of the Reich. 2 
Bavarian opposition to the policies of the Weimar Re-
public went back to World War I and the Treaty of Versailles. 
On January 10, 1920, the enforcement of the conditions of 
the Treaty of Versailles began, and with it a series of 
economic crises for Bavaria. There were two main areas of 
stress caused by the Treaty. First, the Bavarian government 
lost control over the Saar District when the coal mines in 
that region were turned over to France. The Saar mines were 
Bavaria's only major industrial resource, and their loss 
caused severe economic problems. Secondly, the demand of 
the allies for payment in kind from Bavarian agriculture 
(which meant the loss of one mill ion milk cows), knocked 
the already weakened economy into a shambles. 3 
54 
Bavaria.was primarily an agricultural area with very 
1 ittle industry. During the war, there had been severe nu-
tritional problems and food shortageso This was caused 
mostly by the farmers and farm workers being called to the 
war. Thus, agrarian Bavaria was weakened by the war and 
unable to meet the demand for the reparation payments in 
the form of agricultural goods without ham-stringing its 
own peopleo To add insult to injury, Bavaria was supposed 
to export food to the northern part of Germany. Combining 
these two problems, It is easy to see why the prevailing 
political mood in Bavaria would be that of depression, des-
• • d 1 ; 4 perat1on, aggression an even revo ut1on. 
Along with the population, the political parties them-
selves were restless. Before World War I, the SPD, National 
Liberals, and the Farmer's Union (Bauernbund) all demanded 
constitutional reforms for Bavaria. These demands, tabled 
during most of the war, reappeared again with the pease re-
solution of July, 1917. The major goal of the reformers 
had been to change the rather authoritarian state into a 
parliamentary monarchy in which church and state would be 
s e pa r a t e • 5 E qua 1 i t y of rep res en ta t i on fo r a 1 1 c 1 a s s es and 
proportional representation for all parties was also part 
of the reform package. The passage of this reform was a 
long time in coming; It was not until November 2, 1918, 
that King Ludwig of Bavaria signed the proposal into lawo 
By this time, however, these modest constitutional reforms 
were overtaken by events. On November 7, the Putsch of 
55 
Kurt Eisner launched a socialist revolution at Munich which 
climaxed with the proclamation of the Soviet Republic on 
April 7, 1919. 6 
How was this red revolution possible in Catholic 
Bavaria? The overthrow of the government was engineered by 
the radical and revolutionary wing of the independent Social 
Democrats (USPD). The USPD had seceded from the SPD over 
disagreements on major policies, such as whether to end the 
war or not. The Bavarian SPD had always been to the right 
at the national party, earning for itself the nickname 
"Royal Bavarian Social Democrats 11 • But contained within. 
the Bavarian SPD was a smal 1 but aggressive anti-war group, 
which broke away from the original party and joined the 
USPD, which had been founded in April, 1917, at Berlin. 
The leader of the Bavarian USPD was Kurt Eisner, a Berl in-
born Jewish journalist who had come to Bavaria to work for 
the Social Democratic papers in Nuremberg and Munich in 
1907. 7 
Under the stress of war, the situation of Bavaria con-
tinued to worsen, and the Independent Socialists gained 
support. In January, 1918, Eisner, acting in defiance of 
wartime emergency laws, was able to mobilize thousands of 
workers in Nuremberg and Munich. These workers came out 
on strike to demonstrate for a peace without annexationo 
The strike itself lasted but a few days, but it showed that 
the Independent Socialists were becoming an important pol i-
tical influence. As a result of the strike, Eisner was 
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arrested and sent to prison for eight and one-half months. 8 
Eisner was released from prison on October 14, 1918, 
and immediately began new political activities. His goal 
was the overthrow of the existing Bavarian government, and 
he applied two major tactics to achieve it. First of all, 
he held large mass meetings at which he tried to convince 
the bourgeoisie that a revolution was necessaryo Secondly, 
he tried to reduce police and military resistance to his 
ideaso He had great success with both tactics and was ap-
plauded enthusiastically by the 11 masses 11 , who had seen the 
existing monarchy unable to cope with the crisis situation 
existing in Bavaria. While the bourgeoisie were being won 
over at these mass meetings, the radical elements resorted 
to occasional acts of violence and intimidation. The police 
and the military took no action against the resulting dis-
order.9 
Finally, on November 7, 1918, Eisner's revolution took 
place. In an election meeting, he demanded an immediate 
armistice and abdication of the Kaiser. Then a provisional 
workers' and soldiers' council was formed, and Eisner pro-
claimed the Free Republic of Bavaria. In the face of such 
opposition, King Ludwig I I I of Bavaria abdicated. Al 1 the 
duties of the ministers were transferred to the revolution-
ary government. With the release of all officers, adminis-
trators, and soldiers of the monarchy from their oath of 
allegience, the revolution was completed on November 13. 10 
However, this new government showed itself equally as 
57 
incapable of establishing peace and order as the monarchy 
had been. Eisner found himself enmeshed in a series of con-
'tradictions, especially on questions concerning the future 
position of the workers. Eisner's inability to show strong 
and capable leadership led to strong demands from the op-
position parties that new elections be held in order to 
obtain a "legal Bavarian government". Besides this lack of 
confidence of Eisner, there was also widespread mistrust of 
his revolutionary government throughout the general popula-
• 1 1 t 1 on. 
On December 5, only a month after the revolution, 
Eisner's government announced that a general election for 
Bavaria wou·ld be held on January 12, 1919. Many of Eisner's 
fellow socialists regarded this action as a capitulation, 
and it served to further radicalize the left-wing parties. 
On December 6, a Munich chapter of the Spartacus League 
was founded, which soon renamed itself the German Communist 
Party. Max Levien, a Russian-born Leninist, was the man 
responsible for starting the Communist party in Bavaria. 
Levien had become a naturalized German citizen, had served 
in the army, and was chairman of the Munich Soldiers' Coun-
cil during the November Revolution. 12 
Levien's group attempted a red revolution of their own. 
They 11 1 iberated" the newspapers in Munich and 11 gave 11 them to 
their printing staffs. They also captured Erhardt Auer, the 
leader of the SPD, and forced him to resign because he was 
considered to be an enemy of the USPD. It is interesting 
58 
to no t e th a t E i s n e r ca me to Aue r 1 s res cue an d 11 rec a p tu red 11 
the newspapers but made no attempt whatsoever to punish the 
1 • • 1 3 revo ut1onar1es. 
This leftist uprising did not stop the election on 
January 12, in which the voters were confronted by a number 
of choices. First, there was the party in power, Eisner's 
USPD, which adopted a dual strategy for this election. 
Eisner tried to align himself with the Bauerbund, another 
radical group, since his personal hatred for party machines 
had left his party without any effective means of its own 
for turning out great numbers of voters. The other tact1c 
which the USPD used in this election was an appeal to the 
voters• sense of justice based on the idea of allowing those 
who started the revolution to see It through to the end. 
With an election campaign based on these two ideas, it is 
no wonder that the USPD found itself on the bottom of the 
heap. 
Besides Eisner's party, the SPD of course had a stake 
in the elections. Like the USPD, the SPD used the revolu-
tion as a main issueo Auer, the main spokesmen for the SPD, 
claimed that his party was originally responsible for the 
bloodless revolution and that the success of the government 
depended upon the close contact of workers and union members 
14 
with the party officials, which the SPD offered. 
Another party stood in opposition to the SPD: the 
traditional Catholic Center. Because of its rightest, pro-
war position, it needed to change its image in Bavaria. To 
59 
do this, It was given a new name, the Bavarian Peoples' 
Party (BVP), and Protestants were admitted to membership. 
It nevertheless retained close ties with the Catholic 
Church and enjoyed a large following among the fural pop-
ulation. Because the BVP was a ''Bavaria for Bavarians'' 
type of organization, it tended to be anti-Prussian as well 
as anti-Semitic. ·Its election strategy was thus fairly 
simple: Eisner, being both Prussian and Jewish, was a 
"tailor-made hate object" for this party. 15 
In opposition to the BVP, stood the Bavarian wing of 
the Democratic Party (DDP). This group stressed a national 
_point of view, putting its faith in the Reich and looking 
to Ber 1 i n for 1 ea de rs h i p. 1 6 
The ideological battle lines were not so simply drawn, 
however. Parties at odds on every other issue could find 
themselves in agreement on certain points. For example, 
the BVP and the USPD both were zealous in their insistence 
upon Bavarian autonomyo The SPD and the DDP both looked 
to Berl in for guidance and also agreed on strict opposition 
to the traditional influence found in other parties. On 
the other hand, the DDP and the BVP found themselves allied 
in the battle against social ismo The USPD and the SPD both 
accepted theoretical socialism, the SPD perhaps hedging a 
b ·1t . h I l'f" t" l7 wit semant c qua 1 1ca 1onso 
However, all parties agreed on one issue: no more 
monarchy in Bavaria. Although Ludwig had returned to 
II 
Bavaria and was living near Konigssee no move was made to 
60 
put him back in power. In fact, he was held in such low 
regard that an elderly ministry messenger, upon hearing 
that the King's made requested from Eisner's secretary per-
sonal items left behind during the King's flight, remarked, 
11 0 h we 1 1 , th e K i n g ha s ha d s u ch a f r i g h t - - no won de r h e 
1 8 
needs fresh underpa nts 11 • 
Yet the results of the January election showed clearly 
that the Bavarians were dissatisfied with the revolution; 
clearly, left radical ism was not an ideology for this part 
of Germany. The right-wing forces showed gains in this 
election, and Eisner's red revolution fell to the bottom of 
the political barrel. The actual . 19 results were as follows: 
Party Reps. in Diet 
66 
61 
25 
16 
Bavarian People's Party (BVP) 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
German Democratic Party (DDP) 
Peasants League (Bauerbund) 
Independent Socialist Party (USPD) 3 
Others ·9 
% of Total Votes 
35% 
33% 
14% 
9% 
2o5% 
605% 
After the election, a meeting was planned for February 
2.1, 1919, at which the new government would be established 
and Eisner forced to resign. However, the formality of re-
signation never took place. On his way to the meeting, 
Eisner was assassinated by Anton von Arco-Valley, a student 
at the University of Munich. Though the meeting proceeded 
on schedule, more assassinations were attempted. Erhard 
2-0 Auer, the SPD leader and two other delegates were wounded. 
These assassinations and the general disorder at the 
meeting caused great fear the excitement among the people of 
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Bavaria and gave the radicals new reasons to push forward 
h • d f 1 • 21 t e1r propagan a or revo ut1on. To respond to the terror 
'from the right, the USPD called for a three-day general 
strike. The Spartacists and the Communists decided to arm 
the workers, and on February 22, the Workers' Council of 
Munich decided to establish a Bavarian Soviet Republic. 
The situation in Bavaria was one of utter chaos. The SPD, 
BVP, and DDP tried to control the population, but on April 
7, the Communists in Munich officially proclaimed the estab-
1 ishment of a Bavarian Soviet Republ ic. 22 
The spirit of revolution spread to other Bavarian 
cities, and also to cities outside Bavaria. A general state 
of crisis existed throughout the state, but Munich remained 
the major source of trouble. There were street fights on 
the thirteenth and fourteenth of April. The Communists 
gained strength when the bourgeoisie failed in its attempt 
to use part of the garrison at Munich to control the re-
volution. The bourgeoisie lost their weapons, the prole-
tariat gained theirs, and the "Red Army" begin to form. 23 
Meanwhile, by the middle of March a legal government 
was formed under the leadership of Johannes Hoffmann, a 
social Democrat. With the spread of violent revolution 
throughout Bavaria, the government was exiled to Bamberg, 
where it played its last card. Out of desperation, this 
government asked for help from the Reich and the neighbor-
II 
ing states. Troops were sent from Prussia and Wurttemberg 
to Municho These troops were formed largely from the Free 
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Corps comprised mostly of former soldiers and students and 
were led by Col-0nel Ritter von Epp, ex-commander of the 
Bavarian Life Guards. One of their officers, Captain Ernsi 
II 
Rohm, later became the head of the Nazi Storm Troops (SA}. 
These Free Corps troops took control of the situation, and 
by May 1, 1919, the Soviet Republic was 24 no mo re. 
The forces involved in the overthrow of the Soviet 
Republic were supported by students, and those of Erlangen 
were prominent in this role. While their peers in the rest 
of Germany were still debating the relative merits of re-
organizing student 1 ife, the academic youth of Bavaria were 
actively involved in politics and counter-revolution. They 
had made 1 ittle progress toward the creation of a united 
German Student Body when the events of November, 1918, over-
took them. 
Erlangen student life was mostly confined to the tradi-
tional organizations which had existed before World War I, 
such as the Burschenschaft chapters and the Landsmannschaf ten. 
In Erlangen, more than at any other university, the students 
showed a strong preference for joining the already existing 
student organizations rather than organizing the unaffil lat-
ed students or launching nationwide unions. 25 The Buben-
reuther wanted to wait for the return of normal political 
conditions in Bavaria before discussing the merits of a 
general association, while the possibility of organizing 
the unaffiliated students was brought up by representatives 
of the Soviet regime, rather than by the students themselves. 
On the morning of November 9, 1918, it was announced 
that the People of Erlangen would join Eisner's Bavarian 
'Free Republic, and that their city administration would be 
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replaced by a workers' and soldiers' councilo But Erlangen 
was distant from the focus of political power at Munich, 
and the leaders of the Erlangen council feared that students 
d f . h h • d • 26 c an pro essors m1g t oppose t e1r announce action. on-
sequently, these leaders warned the professors against mak-
ing any speeches or announcements that might incite the 
students to action against the new government. 27 However, 
the students at Erlangen were resistant; they were neither 
frightened nor fooled by the new government's attempted de-
privation of their political expressiono The university 
students reacted by forming a united front against this new 
government and immediately announce their intention to sup-
port peace and order in all Bavaria as well as in Erlangen. 
The students did not believe that the Eisner's Bavaria Free 
Republic with its rapid changes could restore normality 
f h f . 28 rom t e post-war con us1on. 
Fol lowing the creation of the Bavarian Republic, the 
Rector of the University immediately called for a general 
meeting for November 11 to advise the students as to how 
they should behave. The Rector desired that the students 
should remain aloof from Eisner's government but take no 
d • • • 29 1rect action to oppose 1to On the other hand, Dr. 
Helmut Plessner, a university administrator, wanted to 
organize the students in their own Rat, or Council, in 
64 
support of the Eisner revolution. But at meetings on Nov-
b 11 th t d f d I h . . 30 em er , e s u en ts re use to ta <e t 1 s action. On 
the following day, the Rector had no trouble convincing the 
students neither t~ form a students' council nor to take 
any direct action against the ~eveloping Communist movemento 
At this meeting, the students demanded that the Reich gov-
ernment in Berlin help restore order to Bavaria. The stu-
dents also voted against the secession of Bavaria from the 
Reich and demanded freedom of political action for them-
selves.31 
As the situation in Bavaria continued to deteriorate, 
the students called another mass meeting in the middle of 
December to demand the resignation of Kurt Eisner, since 
he could no longer control the political crisis in Bavariao 
At this meeting the students also called upon all their Ger-
man comrades to fight against the threat of Bolshevism. 32 
In January, 1919, the Provisional Government in Berlin 
advised the students to join the Free Corps pledged to fight 
against Communism. The students at Erlangen were enthusi-
astic about such measures and eagerly set out to arm them-
selves so that there would be a prepared and organized 
force in case of a Communist Putscho Though the Bavarian 
government had outlawed the activities of the Free Corps 
and forbidden the students to participate in it, the Minis-
ter of Defense in Berlin had already mobilized the Free 
Corps in other states in Germany and encouraged the students 
to join. He ordered Colonel von Epp to build up the Free 
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Corps in Bavaria, even if the government was officially a-
gainst it. 33 
At a meeting of more than a thousand students on March 
27, Edgar Stelzner of the Bubenreuther exhorted the students 
at Erlangen to enter the Free Corps as a united body. 
Stelzner was working with Epp and Gustav Noske, the Reich 
Minister of Defense, in an effort to mobilize the studentso 
About nine hundred of the students were wi 11 ing to join the 
Free Corps, but only under certain conditionso They de-
manded that classwork be suspended, so that those willing 
to interrupt their studies would not suffer the disadvant-
age of being left behind by other studentso The next day, 
the University of Erlangen shut down. This formal closure 
lasted only a short time, since the Educational Office in 
Munich ordered the University to reopen. But since most of 
the professors supported the student in the fight against 
Bolshevism, nothing was taught. 34 
In an effort to stamp out Free Corps recruiting activ-
ity, Eisner's Bavarian government announced that all stu-
dents participating in Corps activities would be denied 
government jobs in the future. In spite of this, the stu-
dents entered the Free Corps with enthusiasm, the Buben-
reuther most of all. Though their initial goal was to 
save Bavaria from Bolshevism, members of the fraternity 
could also be found fighting against the Reds in the Ruhr 
District, Hamburg, and Thuringia under the flags of the 
Free Corps. On April 16, 1919, the Hoffman government in 
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Bamberg called upon the previously outlawed Free Corps to 
restore order t.o Bavaria. Two days later, the Free Corps 
marched on Munich, the students of Erlangen marching with 
them, to establish power firmly in the hands of the Hoffman 
government. The students thereby disallowed Communism and 
held to their idea of supporting "peace and order 11 • 35 
This unified student front at Erlangen was not typical 
of the rest of Bavaria. At Munich, for instance, student 
opinion was divided: some students wanted to stay out of 
the political conflict, while others offered to support the 
public security and administrative services of Eisner's 
government. This provisional government accepted this offer 
and established untrained student guard unitso These auxi-
1 iary units were shortl ived, however, because some of the 
organized students were arrested as hostages after the 
Eisner assassination, and the rest withdrew from the guard 
units for that reason. As the conflict in Munich escalated, 
the University was notified that the students should fol low 
the new government, and that if this was not done immedi-
ately, the Soviet Republic would close the Universi tyo 
Bowing to this order, Munich University formed two council: 
one, a student council, and the other, a Rat (council) com-
posed of Socialist-oriented academicianso On April 7, the 
red flag of Communism was raised over the Universityo It 
seemed that the Munich students were at last unifiedo How-
ever, the next day, April 8, a stud.ent meeting was held at 
which most of the students renounced the actions of April 7, 
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and demanded a return to former conditions, including the 
revival of the Academic Senate. When the Free Corps arrived 
in Munich, many of the university students joined with the 
Corps to oust the Soviet Republ ic. 36 
In the spring of 1919, then, the students at Erlangen 
supported the Weimar Republic in· its effort to suppress the 
Communist revolution in Germany. After the Red Putsch had 
been defeated in May, 1919, they turned to the task of re-
organizing their own student lifeo As elsewhere in Germany, 
the initial steps involved the creation of the German Stu-
dent Body. 
In the process of the reorganization of their student 
1 ife, Erla~gen students reveal certain attributes which show 
that the rightist tendencies at work at other universities 
were intensified at the Franconian institution. In the first 
place, the traditional student groups almost completely 
dominated academic life. In 1919, a new Student Parliament, 
or ASTA, was elected. Of the 1474 students enrolled, 1292 
were qualified to vote. Of those so qualified, 51 o7% act-
ually participated in the election. A large majority (557) 
supported the old traditional organizations, while only 111 
cast their vote in favor of the new German Student Body. 37 
II 
Moreover, the volkisch faith was more popular and influen-
tial at Erlangen than at any other university, and its stu-
d ' N ' 'd 1 38 ents were more receptive to az1 1 eo ogy. 
This fact is primarily attributable to the extremely 
influential position enjoyed by the Bubenreuther, the local 
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chapter of the Burschenschaft. Already in January, 1919, 
the Burschenschaft had adopted a program of political ac-
tion, designed to give students a greater voice in national 
affairso It further took the position that Austrian stu-
dents be fully admitted into German student life and that 
students exercise their influence on behalf of those parties 
which opposed "internationalist" tendencieso Hence, the 
Burschenschaft objectives largely parallel led those pursued 
by the Nationalist Socialist Party. When the Bubenreuther 
of Erlangen faithfully carried out the policy of 11 educating 
students politically" they were, in a sense, rendering them 
more receptive to Nazi propaganda.39 
While the students were busy with their postwar re-
vival of student life at Erlangen, Adolf Hitler was engaged 
in organizing the Nazi Party in Munich. Shortly after join-. 
in Anton Drexler's German Workers' Party in 1919, Hitler 
began to transform the group into a political force. After 
his release from the Army in April, 1920, he became a full-
time agitator for the new party, now called the National 
Socialist German Workers Party, and used his oratorical 
talents to their maximum. 
Though the party remained small and undistinguished 
from many other radical splinter groups, Bavaria provided 
fertile soil for its growtho The Bavarian government of 
Gustav von Kahr, a Bavarian Peoples' Party politician who 
took over after the fall of the So~iet Republic, was itself 
highly reactionary. Moreover, the repeated shocks resulting 
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from the Treaty of Versailles, the shattered economy, and 
the Ruhr Occupation of 1923 kept the population in a state 
of unrest and suspiciono 
Left-wing revolutions ensued, and Saxony and Thuringia 
saw the beginnings of a leftist-orientation in their Social 
Democratic governments. Stresemann, the Chancellor of Ger-
many, was seeking to keep the peace by suppressing radical 
40 political groupso With the prevalent anti-French feel-
ings, the adverse reaction to the Ruhr Occupation, and the 
anti-Bolshevik mood, the Nazi thought they saw their oppor-
tunity to seize power. Though Hitler was uncertain about 
the timing, he decided to act on November 8, 19230 He at-
II II 
tended a major patriotic meeting in the Burgerbraukeller at 
Munich, at which Lossow, the local commander of the Reichs-
wehr, Gustav von Kahr, the Minister President of Bavaria, 
and Gustav Seisser, the director of the Bavarian police, 
were present. Hitler directed his troops to surround the 
building, broke into the meeting, jumped upon a table, and 
announced that the Bavarian and Reich governments were dis-
solved. Hitler then declared that a new government would 
be installed with himself as its leader and that the 
"Criminals of 1918" would be brought to justiceo Hitler 
issued an ultimatum to Kahr, Seisser and Lossow: either 
support his overthrow of the Bavarian government or dieo 
They submitted under pressure. 41 
It appeared that Hitler had won. However, as soon as 
Kahr, Seisser and Lossow escaped from the building, they 
turned against Hitler and his revolution. Kahr outlawed 
the Nazi Party and sent the army to stop the demonstration 
in November, 1923. The army clashed with Hitler's men and 
overcame them, but Hitler escapedo Later, however, he was 
caught, tried and jailed in Landsberg Fortresso The Beer-
Hal 1 Putsch had failed. 42 
One contingent in Hitler's 1 ittle force in the ill-
fated Putsch consisted of students from the University of 
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Municho In 1922, Rudolf Hess, at that time a twenty-eight-
year-old student at Munich, has organized an SA Student 
Company at the University of students affiliated with the 
Academic Circle or the Burschenschafto Prior to the Putsch, 
the Party had provided the company with weaponso After the 
failure of the plot, the students continued to hold meet-
ings and demonstrations in support of Hitler, and some were 
broken up by the pol iceo That members of the Academic Cir-
cle were still loyal to Hitler even after his failure is 
shown by a straw-vote taken at its meeting on November 12: 
70% of those present supported Hitler as opposed to only 
20% for Kahro Because of the violent hostility of the 
Munich students, Kahr ordered the University closed on 
November 130 When it reopened a few days later, things 
h cl b . 43 a ecome quieter. 
While some Munich students actively marched with 
Hitler on November 9, the academic youth of Erlangen ob-
served the event with sympathy and interest but did not 
participate. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Nazi 
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appeal was stronger here perhaps than at any other univer-
sity. ·This is partially attributable to the enormous in-
fluence of the Bubenreuther at the Franconian University. 
Conservative, traditional, experienced and astute in stu-
dent politics, the Bubenreuther had a powerful influence in 
shaping student opinion. 
Mo re o v e r , i n Ed g a r S t e 1 z n e r , the Buben re u the r ha d a 
leader of considerable talent. Stelzner was born in 1892 
in Nuremberg, had served in the army during the War, and 
was elected in 1919 as the head of the Erlangen Student 
Body. He was influential in recruiting students for the 
Free Corps and in 1920 became the head of the German Aca-
demic Circle. Stelzner also played an important role in 
the leadership of the !urschenschaft, and was responsible 
II 
for the organization of the Burschenschaftl iche Blatter, a 
magazine for Burschenschaft members. He maintained his in-
fluence in this organization as chairman of the committee 
II 
concerned with the volkisch idea and keeping a close rela-
tlonship with the student bodies in Austria. He was an 
ardent and effective proponent of anti-Semitism and the 
II 
volkisch idea, and through him, the attitudes of the Buben-
reuther were disseminated to the other larger student as-
II 
sociations. He later became a member of the 11 Volkisch Bloc" 
in the Bavarian Diet from 1924 to 1928 and in 1934 was 
II 44 
named the head of the district court at Wurzburg. 
That the anti-Semitic notions of Stelzner and others 
was in the ascendent at Erlangen is clearly demonstrated 
by the results of the ASTA election of June, 1920, 986 of 
the 1449 students voted. Of these, 458 supported the Aca-
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demic Circle and its platform of excluding Jews from studeht 
organizations, while only 198 supported the more· moderate 
German Student Bodyo The rest of the votes were distributed 
among other smaller groups, such· as religious bodies and 
women's clubs. Stelzner and his ideas dominated student 
life at Erlangen until 1929, when the NSDSTB took over. 45 
The professors of Erlangen were also instrumental in 
shaping student opinion. 46 Many of the professors belonged 
to the German National Peoples Party (DNVP), an amalgation 
of several ideologies. The old monarchist supporters with 
II 
volkisch t~ndencies and those wanting a replacement for the 
radical nationalism of the former Fatherland- Party found 
themselves united in this party. The professors shaped the 
opinion of the students through magazine articles promoting 
II 
the volkisch idea, gave speeches on this subject at the 
university, and urged limitations on the enrollment of 
Jewish students. 47 Professorial influence on student 
political attitudes is well illustrated by their perfor-
mance at the Empire Day Celebration on January 18, 1922. 
The professors delivered speeches against the 11 crime 11 of 
Versailles, condemning the treaty as incompatible with 
their idea of the German nation. 48 
Oddly enough, the Academic Circle boycotted this 
cel~bration because its members believed that such a pa-
triotic expression might imply that they supported the 
Weimar Republic. The students were offended by the fact 
that the colors of the Republ ic 1 s flag had been the tradi-
tional colors of the Burschenschaft since 18170 Even to 
honor soldiers who had died in World War I was difficult 
for them because they were afraid that this would suggest 
that they died for the Republ ic. 49 
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In their propaganda campaigns, the NSDAP made good use 
of the students' refusal to attend this meeting. In 1921, 
a pamphlet was sent to Erlangen inviting the students to 
attend a Munich speech by Hitler on the topic, 11 German 
You th , Ge r ma n Fu tu re 11 • 5 O A ye a r 1 a t e r , the NS DA P t r i e d to 
get the students to leave the University and become members 
of the Storm Troopers (SA) in order to help save Germany; 
later, when the national was secure, the students could go 
back to their studies. Although the NSDAP was most active 
in its propaganda campaign in Bavaria, there was also ac-
tivity at other universities in other German states. At 
II 
the university of Gottingen, for example, there were al-
ready 11 thousands 11 of Hitler supporters by 1923. 51 
Under the influence of the Bubenreuther, the students 
of Erlangen were looking for a strong political leader who 
II 
would embrace the volkisch mystique and incorporate their 
anti-Semitic tendencies into national policy. At first 
they looked to Ludendorff for leadership, hoping that he 
could deal with the problems of the Ruhr Occupation, in-
flation, and internal political instability. 52 Then, in 
the summer of 1923, Adolf Hitler came to Erlangen to make 
a speecho This had been arranged by the Bubenreuther, and 
all members were required to attend. Hitler was enthusi-
astically received by the st~dents, and his ideas fit in 
II 
well with their volkisch and anti-Semitic views. Hitler 
blamed German's chaotic economic situation on the Jews, 
saying that they held the reins on world capitalo He also 
asserted that the Weimar Republic had been spoiled by the 
Jews, who were unfit to govern. Such expression as these, 
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plus Hitler 1 s abilities as a speaker, made him the Erlangen 
students• favorite and the man they would choose as their 
political leader.53 
Many of the students had been convinced Nazi support-
ers before Hitler's visit, and after the speech, their 
ranks began to swell. The NSDSTB could boast 120 members, 
with more joining all the time. Thus in 1923 Erlangen be-
came the first German university to establish a formal Na-
tlonal Socialist student group. It was inevitable that 
such a group should develop, but it is still somewhat sur-
prising that Erlangen developed the first. Erlangen was 
considered a conservative university which did not encour-
age the formation of new student associations. However, 
pressure from the Bubenreuther to show sympathy for the 
NSDAP spurred the students on to become formally organizedo 
The students at Erlangen were now able to show public and 
II 
officially organized support for Hitler and the volkisch 
idea. 54 
Opportunity for such display came on September 2, 1923, 
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when the Bubenreuther, which included most of the Erlangen 
student body, attended the Nuremberg Convention to demon-
II 
strate support for the volkisch national ideology. Students 
came from all parts of Germany in order to take part in the 
ceremony. A church service was first held before an altar 
decorated with flags, dominated by the swastika banner of 
the NSDAP. Speeches from Hitler and Ludendorff followed, 
in which both glorified the National Movement. Hitler and 
Ludendorff saw themselves accepted enthusiastically when at 
noon about seventy thousand people marched past in reviewo 
The students present at this event seemed convinced that 
the revival of Germany only could be achieved through Hitler 
and Ludendorff .55 
Enthusiasm at Erlangen for the National Socialist 
Movement was increasing rapidly during the fall of 1923. 
The students reported daily from Munich about Hitler's plans 
to march to Berl in. They were so inspired and impressed 
with this idea that they could hardly wait for something 
to happeno The Bubenreuther even undertook military train-
ing to be ready to support Hitler in case of resistanceo 
Finally, on November 9, while the Bubenreuther was having 
a private meeting, a telegram arrived with the news they 
had been hoping to hear: 11 Establ ishment of the National 
Government of Hitler, Ludendorff, and Kahr 11 • 56 The hap-
piness and excitement among the Bubenreuther was so great 
that they at first refused to accept the news which fol-
lowed shortly thereafter: the Putsch had failed. While 
76 
the Bubenreuther and most of the students at Erlangen re-
mained prepared to defend Hitler in case of resistance, they 
gradually and reluctantly accepted the reality of Hitler's 
failure. 57 
In order to express their frustration, they called a 
meeting on November 12 in defiance of Kahr 1 s admonition 
from Munich. From this meeting they sent a protest tele-
gram to Kahr in which they pledged their allegiance to the 
II 5 8 leader of the "volkisch freedom movement". 
The failure of the Putsch meant that the NSDAP was 
forbidden and the students would have to keep quiet about 
Hitler. The Nazi Student League was formally dissolved, 
but found~ way to continue its existence by changing its 
II 
name to "radical volkisch". But the enthusiasm was not as 
evident as it had been. Part of this may have been due to 
the reaction of the Bubenreuther, who were so disappointed 
over the failure that for three years they seemed almost 
resignedo Of course, the annual yearly demonstration a-
gainst the Treaty of Versailles took placeo At the 1924 
demonstration, the signers of the Treaty were called 
"international-pacifistic people-destroyers", and the SPD 
and Center Party were branded enemies of the fatherland. 
However, the old enthusiasm was not there anymore. 59 
By 1926, the Bubenreuther decided to become active a-
gain, after the NSDSTB at Munich was revivedo Now they be-
gan to hold meetings at which speeches concerning Marxism, 
the Jewish Question, etc., were made. When the prohibition 
77 
against speeches about Hitler lapsed in 1927, the National 
Social"ist movement experienced a rebirtho Many Bubenreuther 
entered the NSDAP durtng that year and worked actively in 
the development of the SA and political propaganda, and 
many of the Bubenreuther even left Erlangen to help estab-
1 ish and develop NSDSTB groups at other universities. 60 
Of course, the Bubenreuther put their best efforts in-
to reviving a strong NSDSTB at Erlangen. Attempts were 
made in 1926 and 1927 but they were not permanent. This 
was not because of opposition to the NSDSTB, but rather be-
cause Nazi ideas were so generally accepted that there 
seemed little point in further efforts to strengthen them. 
In 1928, however, the NSDSTB established a strong founda-
ti on and soon came to dominate the student parl iamento By 
1929, the rival Academic Circle was eclipsed in influence, 
and the ASTA was dominated by the NSDSTB the following year. 
Though the traditional groups kept their names, they al 1 
affiliated with the NSDSTB. 
The students at Erlangen were early and strong sup-
porters of the Hitler movement. Hitler appeared before 
the student body there no less than five times between 
1923 and 1933. And when the swastika banner were raised 
over the university on January 31, 1933, many students 
believed that Hitler's assumption of power represented 
the triumph of their own traditional . 6 1 aims. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND NAZI 
CONSOLIDATION 
The Third Reich began on January 30, 1933, when the 
Reich President appointed Hitler to the Chancellorship at 
the head of a cabinet of 11 National Concentration". Only 
three of the eleven members of this cabinet were National 
Socialists: Hitler, Dr. Frick, Min_ister of the Interior~ 
and Hermann Georing, Commissioner for Air Communications 
and Minister without Portfolio. Of the remaining eight 
ministers, six were members of, or sympathizers with, the 
Nationalist Partyo Two were without official party af~ 
filiation, but were counted as Nationalists. 1 
This scheme of organization did not recognize the 
political genius of Hitler or the ruthlessness of Goering, 
who held in readiness elaborate Nazi plans. In keeping 
with German parliamentary practice, the Reich President 
dissolved the Reichstag on March 5, 1933, in order to let 
the electorate decide upon its tenure of office, since the 
Cabinet did not have a majority in the Reichstag. The 
bourgeois part}es and the socialists were not at first dis--
hartened, because they believed that the Nazis could not 
2 
expect to attract more than about 40% of the voters. 
The emergency decrees of February 4 and February 28, 
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however, marked Hitler's first assault on the constitutional 
barriers against dictatorship. The first of these decrees 
empowered the government to ban newspapers and public as-
semblies. The second, entitled "Ordinance for the Protec-
tion of Nation and State", suspended for an indefinite per-
iod the constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. The 
latter decree was a decisive development in the transforma-
tion of Germany from a 1 iberal democracy to a police state. 
The suspension of the civil 1 iberties of Weimar Germany end-
ed not only individual freedoms but the chance for free com-
petition among the various political forcesa The decree of 
February 28 was a cornerstone of the Nazi political struc-
ture and remained in force until Hitler 1 s end in 1945.3 
President Hindenburg had sanctioned this decree on the 
basis of Nazi allegations that the burning of the Reichstag 
Building on February 27 had been plotted by the Communist 
Party and was to have been the signal for a nationwide Com-
munist uprising. Although the Nazis have been blamed for 
starting the fire as a pretext to justify their persecution, 
the true origins of the fire are still unknown. Whatever 
its origins, Hitler exploited the fire as both a justifica-
tion of the suspension of civil liberties and as an issue 
i n the Ma r ch 5 , 1 9 3 3 , Re i ch s ta g e 1 e c t i on s • 4 
Despite a virtual Nazi monopoly on the means of mass 
communications and political propaganda, the elections of 
March 5 did not produce the Nazi landslide that Hitler had 
expectedo In spite of the emergency decree of February 4, 
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Socialist, Communist and Catholic Center Party voters re-
mained surprisingly impervious to Nazi urgings and threatso 
To be sure, SPD strength declined from 20.7% to 18.3%, 
KP D s t re n g t h d e c l i n e d f r o m 1 6 • 11 % to 1 2 • 3 % , a n d th e Ce n t e r 
Party vote decreased from 15% to 14% from the election of 
November, 1932. While the Nazi strength increased from 
33.1% to 43%, this was due more to the support of newly 
registered voters and previous non-voters than to defec-
tions from other parties. Voter participation was at an 
unusually high 89 percent. The Nazi Party, though it fell 
short of a majority, nonetheless secured control over the 
new Reichstag with the support of its Nationalist allies, 
who polled 8 percent of the vote. Germany had for the 
first time since 1930 a government supported by a parlia-
mentary majority, which made Hitler less dependent upon 
President Hindenburg's confidence than his predecessors, 
II . 5 
Bruning, Papen, and Schleicher had ever been. 
Hitler carefully staged the opening of the newly 
e·lected Reichstag on March 21, 1933, in a great ceremony 
in the Potsdam Garrison Church over the tombs of Frederick 
William I and Frederick the Great. Tihe symbolic bringing 
together of Hindenburg, the Crown Prince, the army leader-
ship, the Nazi bosses, and the Reichstag in a shrine of 
Prussian history was to dramatize the union between aris-
trocratic Prussia and dynamic Nazism. Thus the speeches 
and ceremonies of the "Day of Potsd.am" served the Nazi pur-
pose of claiming the succession to the grandeur of Imperial 
84 
Germany as well as attaching the Hindenburg mystique to the 
N • . f . 6 az1 course o action. 
After the rites of Potsdam, Hitler proceeded to deprive 
the Reichstag of its legislative function and thereby el imi-
nated the second obstacle in his path toward personal dicta-
torship. The Enabling Act ("Law for Terminating the Suffer-
ing of People and Nation"), passed by the Reichstag on March 
24, 1933, gave over the legislative powers of the Reichstag 
to the Chancellor for a four-year periodo This act was not 
a simple law but a constitutional change and thus required 
a two-thirds majority for passageo 
The Catholic Center, through threats and false pro-
mises, was led to believe that the Emergency Decree of 
February 4 would be revoked in return for its voteo Hitler 
in 1 ike manner secured the support of al 1 parties except 
the Social Democrats. The Communists, since their deputies 
had not been seated in the new Reichstag, posed no problem. 
Social Democratic opposition to the Enabling Act, though 
futile, was nevertheless a demonstration of moral and phy-
sical courage, all the more so because Nazi storm troopers 
were placed conspicuously among the voting deputies. 7 
The dissolution of the political parties, either by 
order of the government or by their own decisions, followed 
as a natural corollary the self-immolation of the Reichstag. 
After the SPD was banned on June 22, 1933, the other parties 
announced their dissolution in Julyo On July 14, 1933, a 
law against the formation of new parties declared the Nazi 
8 party the sole political party of Germany •. 
Once the civil 1 iberties and the powers of the Reich-
stag were eliminated, Hitler proceeded to dismantle the 
federal structure of Germanyo The Emergency Decree of 
February 28, which authorized the national government to 
take over the police powers of the federal states, was the 
first stepo After the Enabling Act, Hitler dissolved all 
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state legislatures and reorganized them on the basis of the 
results of the national election of March 5. In April, 
1933, Nazi governors were appointed to all federal states. 
In January, 1934, all state legislatures were dissolvedo 
A month later, the Reichsrat, the upper chamber and repre-
sentative body of the states, was abolished. The Nazi 
governors became solely responsible to the Minlstry of the 
Interior, and the federal states were reduced to administra-
tive districtso Germany had become a unitary state. 9 Iron-
ically, the abolition of the federal structure of Germany 
has been a goal strongly advocated by many Social Democrats 
during the Revolution of 1918-1919. The Nazi revolution 
accomplished without opposition and in short order what the 
Socialist Revolution of 1918 had failed to doo 
A low of Apri 1 7, 1933, established the Nazi control 
over the civil service. This law, "For the Restoration of 
the Career Civil Service11 , empowered the regime to dismiss 
civil servants for reasons of past political activity or 
• 1 • • 1 0 rac1a or1g1n. Except for the institution of the presi-
dency and the armed forces, all obstacles to his absolute 
86 
dictatorship had been removed by Hitler within a year of his 
rise to power. Fearing a full blown Nazi dictatorship, 
Hindenburg and his allies tried to sway Hitler to restore 
the monarchy, but after the President's death in August, 
1934, Hitler simply combined the offices of President and 
Chancellor under the title "Fuehrer and Reich-Chancel lor 11 • 11 
His last concern had been the armyo The escalation of 
tension between the regular army and Hitler's SA formations 
was due to the contempt that the largely aristocratic re-
gular army felt toward the proletarian element in the Nazi 
1 2 
movement. Though Hitler showed particl ity toward his SA 
because its views were closed to his own, the army leader-
ship believed that he would end the political quarreling of 
the Weimar Republic and a new and more hopeful era would 
begin. Because of the friction between the SA and Reich-
wehr, the SA, numbering one mill ion under the leadership of 
Ernst Roehm, favored merging their forces with the army. l3 
Roehm and the SA became impatient with Hitler's 11 legal 11 
revolution and favored instead a second social revolution. 
This problem was solved when Hitler 1 s elite guard, the SS, 
conducted a surprise attack on June 30, 1934, known as the 
11 Blood Purge". Those executed included Gregor Strasser, 
ex-Chancellor, General van Schleicher and his wife, Gustav 
Kahr, who had crushed Hitler 1 s Beerhall Putsch of 1923, and 
others unrelated to his quarrel with the SA. 14 Hitler used 
the low of July 3, 1934, to sanctify his murders as protec-
tion of the state against a treasonable conspiracy. The 
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army submission to Hitler beginning on June 30, 1934, paved 
the way for Hitler's using the swastika eagle on the German 
army uniform as well as the new loyalty oath. l5 
Hitler consolidated his power very quickly~ and was 
thus free to establish a totalitarian regime with every 
phase of German life under his thumbo In the domains of 
e d u ca t i on a n d cu 1 tu re , Na i i po 1 i c i es f o r re fo rm of the u n i -
versities had three goals; to force these institutions to 
serve the party, to insure that the faculty promulgate the 
ideology of National Social ism, and to find a 11 new di rec-
tion 11 for the scienceso Consistent with the program, the 
universities became wards of the state. The political ed-
ucation of ·the students was to be directed toward fulfill-
ing their duties toward the Third Reich, which originated 
• b d 11 1 k" h 1 • • 16 1n race- ase vo 1sc po 1c1es. 
Their purpose in the field of education was above all 
to mold the minds of the young, for Hitler firmly believed 
th a t 11w hoe v e r con t r o 1 1 e d th e you th , he 1 d the f u tu re i n h i s 
hands 11 • The schools were converted into propaganda mills 
to turn out 11 good Nazis". Besides reorganizing the curri-
culum to include racial studies, genetics, and race hygiene, 
the Nazi regime also introduced textbooks which properly 
g 1 o r i f i e d th e Na t i on a 1 Soc I a 1 i s t move me n t • 1 7 0 u ts i d e · th e 
school, other agencies were organized to inculcate the 
Nazi doctrines into German youtho The various Hitler or-
ganizations enrolled boys and girls from ten to eighteen. 18 
After 1936, membership was made obligatory for all boys and 
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girls of Aryan stock. 19 Control over the universities was 
achieved with little difficulty. The new civil service law 
of April 7, 1933, eliminated Jews and opponents of the re-
. . f h f 1 • . 20 g1me rom t e acu ties. Next, on the twenty-fifth of 
April, the number of students at the universities was re-
duced and 1 imits were placed on Jewish enrollment. Of all 
entering students, only 1 .5 percent were to be Jews. In 
all universities there were to be no more than a total of 
5 percent with Jewish bloodo 21 The students generally wel-
corned the decision to reduce the number of Jewish students, 
and Burschenschaft magazine articles enthusiastically sup-
ported a government pol icy committed to war against the 
Jews. 22 The opinion of the majority of the German student 
body was that universities must be cleaned of both Jews and 
Jewish influence. Hitler's pronouncements and acts against 
the 11 un-German mi nd 11 met with their agreement. In order to 
destroy Jewish influence at the universities, all 11 un-
German" literature must be eradicatedo This became a real-
ity on March 10, 1933, when all German universities burned 
11 contaminated 11 1 i teratureo Some authors, such as Erich 
II 
Kastner, Heinrich Mann or Eric Remarque, who helped to give 
Germany international recognition, were symbolically burned 
in effigy. 23 
Besides this, the students even demanded that Jewish 
works had to be published in the Hebrew language. When 
published in German they were to be. designated as transla-
tions since it was thought a Jew using the German language 
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1 ied in the process. In addition, the students demanded 
that Jewish professors be forced to resign. This demand 
was of course supported by the government. Immediately 
J • h f . d f h • • b 24 ew1s pro essors were eJecte rom t e1r JO s. 
Now what to do with the students themselves was another 
question that the Nazis had to consider. The NSDSTB had 
controlled the German student body since 1931, and in that 
year introduced the idea of the "strong leader". This meant 
that the student parliaments at each university were to be 
subject to the authority of a single elected national lead-
er. It meant also that the student groups would lose their 
. 2 5 
autonomy and be consolidated under a single author1 ty. · 
II 
At the annual meeting of the German Student Body in Konigs-
II 
berg in 1932, Gerhard Kruger, head of the NSDSTB, moved that 
this hierarchical organization be adopted for all students• 
Even the majority of the committee of the parliament 
II 
heads voted for Kruger 1 s proposal, but nothing came of it 
immediately because of the resistance by the traditional 
organizations in the Student Body, expecially the Burschen-
26 
schaft. The Burschenschaft saw the potential danger of 
an unrestrainable dictatorship of the NSDSTB and refused to 
go along with the parliament plan. 27 Too late, the Bursch-
enschaft leaders recognized the threat to their leadership, 
d • • d • d d 28 tra 1t1ons, an 1n epen ence. To be sure, they had been 
strong supporters of Nazi ideologies, but now they became 
anxious to retain their influence over the NSDSTB, rather 
than being absorbed by it. Consequently, they argued in 
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1933 that students should not yield to "irresponsible 
speeches and fraternal strife", and urged that they uphold 
a "sense of responsibility" and logical thinking. The Bur-
schenschaft was afraid of the new fanaticism, but they of-
fered nothing to oppose it but the habitual caution of a 
traditionally minded older generation. 29 
With Hitler's coming to power in January 31, 1933, the 
power struggle behind the scences between the Burschenschaft 
II 
and the NSDSTB came into the open. On the same day, Kruger 
sent a letter to Rudolf Hess, head of the Central Commis-
sion of the Nazi Party, in which he demanded the abolition 
of the student parliamentary elections. He argued that the 
results of such elections might result in propaganda unfav-
II 
arable to the Nazis. At the same time, however, Kruger 
guaranteed the Burschenschaft and other traditional groups 
h • • 3 0 t e1r existence. 
But it was not so simple to win the full support of 
that remarkable and proud organization. Differences with-
in the Burschenschaft prevented thiso Its magazines were 
flooded with articles which differed in suggestions about 
how the Burschenschaft should align themselves with the new 
Reich in order to surviveo There were two main factions 
within the Burschenschaft: the hyper-politically oriented 
one and the super-traditionalists. 31 These two groups a-
greed in their unquestionable allegiance to the Nazi Ideo-
logy and their adoration of Adolf Kitler. 32 But the more 
politically oriented faction thought that the Burschenschaft 
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should provide the training grounds for educational prepara-
tion of the idealists of National Social ism.33 The "tradi-
tional 11 faction on the other hand, held that the Burschen-
schafter should work for political ends but not be complete-
ly controlled in his individual life by the Nazi Party. 34 
This dispute necessitated a meeting in June, 1933, at 
the traditional shrine of the Wartburg. This meeting was 
the political and organizational turning point within the 
Burschenschaft: the "leadership principle" replaced the 
parliamentary system within the organization, and the de-
cisive step was taken toward Nazi coodination. 35 The new 
leader was Otto Schwab, who was also the leader of a SA 
troop as well as a Party member. 36 The meeting was solemn-
ly concluded with a symbolic gesture to proclaim loyalty 
to Hitler and his movemento As they confessed their faithj 
the Burschenschaft felt at that moment that the spirit of 
the German nation was with them.37 
After this meeting, Schwab immediately began to use 
his new position to take action. He introduced the policy 
that the freshmen be trained en mass in military exercises, 
sports, and political activities in line with Nazi ideologyo 
As a result of the reorganization, the structure of the 
Burschenschaft became identical to that of the NSDSTB. 
Each Burschenschaft chapter had a leader controlled by the 
nationwide leader, Schwab. 38 Though his subsequent actions 
created dissatisfaction among a few, they had little re-
courseo The direction was clear: Schwab's actions con-
curred with Nazi policies and spelled the beginning of the 
end for the Burschenschaft. 39 
The effects of this reorganization can be seen in the 
fate of the Bubenreuther of Erlangen. Though this frater-
nity was among the most traditional in Germany, it had 
identified itself early with the· National Socialist move-
mento By 1930, when the NSDSTB obtained a majority in the 
Erlangen student parliament, the majority of the Buben-
92 
reuther had already become members of the NSDSTB. General-
ly speaking, when a student representative voted Buben-
reuther, he was in effect voting NSDSTB. Unlike the nation-
al situation in 1931, when the Burschenschaft competed a-
gainst the NSDSTB, there was no competition at Erlangen 
between the Bubenreuther and the Nazi Group; they were 
• 11 "d • 1 '10 v1rtua y 1 ent1ca • The Bubenreuthers' Nazi sympathies 
were quite wel 1 known; the members of the fraternity proud-
ly attended Nazi mass meetings in their distinctive uni-
41 forms and distributed announcements for the Party. They 
appeared to be strong and united supporters of Nazismo 
Yet they soon learned that one could not merely support 
the Nazis: ultimately, all would be swallowed up and ab-
sorbed by the Partyo The first realization of this unplea-
sent fact occurred in 1933, when the national Burschenschaft 
adopted the "leadership principle". The Bubenreuther op-
posed this reorganization, holding instead that the Bursch-
enschaft should retain its autonomy, free of identification 
. h h ~· • 42 wit t e 1~az1 movement. The Bubenreuther objected to the 
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mass character of Nazism, and feared that the distinctive-
ness and exclusivity of their organization would be swallow-
ed up in the "numbers, masses, equality, and mediocrity" of 
the Nazi movement. Thus the Bubenreuther strenuously ob-
jected to the directive by the National Burschenschaft head-
quarters which would turn fraternity houses into barracks 
113 for the training of young Party members. They further 
fulminated against the rumor that Schwab, the national Bur-
schenschaft leader, wanted to abolish all fraternity colors, 
44 
symbols, and passwords. 
The Bubenreuther of Erlangen came into direct conflict 
with the national Burschenschaft in June, 1933, over the 
question of admitting 11 non-Aryans 11 into membership. The 
national office had decreed t~at no one who had even a re-
mote relationship to Jews could be a membero Now it so 
happened that a highly placed, prominent, and highly re-
garded "old boy" of the Bubenreuther fraternity was married 
11 5 to a woman whose grandfather had been "non-Aryan". The 
Bubenreuther kept the gentleman on their rolls and tried 
to cover up his less than impeccable racial purityo After 
a long and vituperous dispute, the national Burschenschaft 
finally voted on April 8, 1934, to expel 46 the Bubenreuther. 
Thus, the national organization and the local chapter at 
Erlangen went their own ways to distruction at the hands of 
the Nazi 11 coordinators 11 o On October 18, 1935, the entire 
Burschenschaft met at the Wartburg and dissolved their or-
ganization. The membership announced that they were now 
openly and completely integrating into the Third Reich. 
Th i s a· c t w a s s y m b o 1 i zed by t h e i r re 1 i n q u i s h i n g o f th e B u r -
schenschaf t flag to the leader of the NSDSTB, who welcomed 
them as comrades. 47 
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After the abdication of the Burschenschaft, it was but 
three months unti 1 the Bubenreuther fol lowed suit. Only 
the manner of their demise was differento On January 26, 
1936, Hess announced at an annual student body meeting that 
henceforth anyone belonging to a traditional organization 
would be considered un-German in Hitler's eyes. Four days 
later at a university celebration at Erlangen, the Buben-
reuther and other traditional groups were requested to re-
move their distinguishing colors and symbols or leave the 
banquet hall. They left the hall, went to their house, and 
along with the other traditional groups officially dissolved 
48 themselves. The Nazis had attained their goal: to unify 
all students into one mass of mediocrity. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
It is often asked how the National Socialists were able 
to take control of Germany. The simplest answer to this 
question is that the state of mind of the German people was 
propitious for acceptance of Nazism. Many factors helped 
to prepare for the Nazi victoryo First among these was the 
defeat of Germany in World War I, which bitterly hurt the 
pride of the strongest continental power. Since the Weimar 
system was associated with the defeat, there was never much 
zeal for the Republic. Second, the inflation of 1922-1923 
was a contributing factor. By impoverishing the lower mid-
dle class, it caused the members of this class to seize up-
on the extravagant promises of Hitler and the Nazis. Third, 
the resentment against the Treaty of Versailles must not be 
overlookedo Most Germans regarded this treaty as a humi 1 ia-
tion and were willing to listen when Hitler and the Nazis 
promised to free Germany from its shackles. Fourth, the 
economic blizzard which hit Germany in 1930, leaving wide-
spread unemployment and bankruptcies in its wake, prepared 
mil lions of Germans to follow anyone who promised them jobs 
and bread. Finally, the power of Hitler's cratory convinc-
ed the German people that he was their man of destiny. 
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Though these five factors help explain the fact that 
students also supported Hitler, their susceptibility to the 
Nazi appeal had a different and more basic origin as wello 
To be sure, the economic conditions of the country affected 
the students to a more intense degree than the general pop-
ulation at large. But in truth, the attraction which 
National Socialism had for students was based more on 
ideological considerations than on economic concernso In-
stead of concerning themselves with the economic plight of 
the nation in their postwar meetings, the student body de• 
bated ideological or racial issues, such as how to keep the 
Jews from polluting German culture and how to unify German 
speaking students and countrieso These questions which pre-
II 
occupied the students' minds came mainly from the volkisch 
nations of the traditionalist Burschenschaften and their 
II 
compatriots in Austria. It was this volkisch dogma, already 
strong among student organizations, which made them easy 
victims for Nazi propaganda. 
II 
The volkisch persuasion impl led a desire to unify all 
German-speaking people under one leadershipo The Treaty 
of Versailles divided the German-speaking people; hence it 
became anathemao Because the students identified the 
Treaty with the new Republic, they would not support or 
identify with the Republ ico The Republic was not of 11 Ger-
man 11 origin and it had no precedent in German thinking. 
II 
The volkisch thinkers also saw the .presence of Jews in 
their culture as an additional barrier in their efforts to 
100 
complete the unification of pure Germanso The students 
were ~specially· hostile toward the presence of Jewish ln-
fluence or intellectual leadershipo Therefore, they were 
receptive to speechmakers 1 ike Hitler who pointed to the 
Jews as the source of many of Germany's national problemso 
The students thought that they would lead the way to-
II 
ward the achievement of volkisch goals by first unifying 
all German Students into one student bodyo Their attempt 
at unification started well in 1919 with the foundation of 
the Deutsche Studentenschaft. However, the Burschenschaft 
split from the Deutsche Studentenschaft after only one year 
because the Studentenschaft did not sufficiently emphasize 
II 
volkisch thinking. In 1920 the Burschenschaft, together 
II 
with other volkisch-oriented students, founded their own 
organization, the German Academic Circle. By 1924 the 
German Academic Circle controlled the majority of the stu-
dent parliaments in Germanyo This indicates that the inter-
est of students was directed more toward the accumulation 
of power for the purpose of advancing than toward finding 
solutions to their own economic plight. The students had 
already set a national stage for the development of Nation-
al Socialism before the Nazis came to powero The Burschen-
schaft had long sought to unify all German students into a 
single organization. This made it difficult for them to 
complete successfully against the Nazi Student League be-
tween 1931 and 1933, for the League espoused the same goal. 
Ultimately, the Burschenschaft was absorbed into the Nazi 
1 0 1 
Student League. In 1935 they threw away 128 year~ of Bur-
schenschaft heritage voluntarily. The example of the 
Bubenreuther demonstrates how this surrender took placeo 
The German stud~nts help~d to ~uild an ideological base for 
National Socialism, were duped into supporting the Nazis, 
and then were engulfed by the political monster they helped 
bring to prominence. 
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